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Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts:
Why Plaintiffs Win and Should
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES*
This Article is the first comprehensive study of how American courts have resolved
conflicts of laws arising from cross-border torts over the last four decades. This period
coincides with the confluence of two independent forces: (i) a dramatic increase in the
frequency and complexity of cross-border torts generated by the spectacular expansion
of cross-border activity now known as globalization; and (2) the advent of the
American choice-of-law revolution, which succeeded in demolishing the old regime in
forty-two U.S. jurisdictions, but failed to replace it with anything resembling a unified
system.
One of the findings of the Article is that, despite using different approaches and
invoking varied rationales, courts that have joined the revolution have reached fairly
uniform results in resolving cross-border tort conflicts: they have applied the law of the
state of either the injurious conduct or the resulting injury, but, in the vast majority of
cases (eighty-six percent), they have applied whichever of the two laws favored the tort
victim. Another finding is that the vast majority of recent conflicts codifications around
the world (a total of twenty) have adopted the same solution: they apply whichever law
favors the victim, by authorizing either the court or the victim directly to make the
choice.
The Article concludes by examining whether the results of the American cases can be
compressed into new content-sensitive, result-selective choice-of-law rules which would
be free of the vices of the old rules and would be easy for judges to apply. It answers
the question in the affirmative and, to prove the point, it offers three options for such
rules.
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INTRODUCTION
Cross-border torts, namely, those in which the injurious conduct and
the resulting injury occur in different states or countries, have been
constantly on the rise.' For example, according to the Federal Trade
Commission, the number of complaints involving fraud across the United
States border rose by more than five hundred percent in a recent four-
year period.2 Similarly, as the publishers of the Wall Street Journal have
learned the hard way, the international connectivity of the internet has
brought not only expanded readership, but also new risks of being haled
into court in far-away countries like Australia and being subject to
unfavorable foreign laws.3 This dramatic increase in the frequency and
complexity of cross-border conflicts has occurred at a time when
American courts are experimenting with new methods and approaches
i. Any tort that can be committed from a distance such as environmental pollution, defamation,
fraud, invasion of privacy, and products liability, can be a cross-border tort if the injurious conduct and
resulting injury occur in different states.
2. From 2000 to 2004, the number of complaints involving fraud across U.S. borders has grown
from 12,208 to 61,744, an increase of 5o6%. These numbers do not include fraud across state borders
within the United States. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER SENTINEL: CROSS-BORDER FRAUD
TRENDS, JANUARY-DECEMBER 2004, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/
crossborder/PDFs/Cross-BorderCY-2004.pdf. "[C]onsumers in the U.S. and other countries lose
billions of dollars each year to telemarketers operating from 'boiler rooms' across the border who
pitch bogus products, services and investments. They also lose money to Internet scam artists who
operate anonymously from places outside the U.S." Federal Trade Commission-Cross Border Fraud,
http://www.ftc.gov/crossborder/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
3. In Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 6o6-o8 (Austl.), the High Court of
Australia held that Australian courts had jurisdiction and could apply Australian law in a defamation
action brought by an Australian citizen against a U.S. publisher for allegedly-defamatory remarks
contained in an online publication (Barron's Online) posted at a New York website. Because of its
inherently transnational nature, the internet can generate many cross-border torts, like the ones
mentioned in the previous note, and also provides an easier conduit for defamation. Indeed, it has
been characterized as "a defamation prone zone." See Lilian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet, in
LAW AND THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE 183, 184 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds.,
1997), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/it& law/cxo main.htm; see also id. at 183 ("Because of the
international connectivity of the Internet, its speedy transmission of huge amounts of data
simultaneously to multiple destinations, and general lack of respect for national borders, it is
extremely easy for an individual to make a defamatory comment via a computer situated in rone
country] attached to the Internet, which can then be read by thousands if not millions of people
similarly equipped in multiple other national jurisdictions-where .. . the law of, and defences to,
defamation may be very different. .. )
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for resolving conflicts of laws. This Article reports the results of the first
comprehensive study of how American courts have discharged the
difficult task of resolving cross-border tort conflicts and offers some
suggestions for the future.
The increase in the frequency and complexity of cross-border torts
began even before "globalization" became a term du jour. As early as
1961, in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., the
Illinois Supreme Court observed in an oft-quoted statement that new
means of product distribution and increased cross-border commercial
activity had "largely effaced the economic significance of State lines."4
What the court said then about state borders within the United States is
also true today of international borders. In Gray, the question was
whether Illinois could exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
that had manufactured a safety valve in Ohio for a water heater
manufactured by another defendant in Pennsylvania and then sold in
Illinois, where it exploded and injured the plaintiff.5 As the Asahi Metal
Industries Co. v. Superior Court6 case illustrates, the Illinois case has
been replicated many times across national borders.
Both Asahi and Gray involved only the question of judicial
jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. This Article focuses on the next
step, choice of law, which courts consider only after affirmatively
answering the jurisdictional question. From a choice-of-law perspective,
cross-border torts have always been problematic, even in the simpler
days of the nineteenth century, before the First Conflicts Restatement
pushed the difficulties under the rug by subjecting all cross-border torts
to the law of the place of injury (the lex loci delicti rule).7 Thus, the
Illinois court could proclaim in full confidence that "[t]he law of Illinois
will govern the substantive questions" in Gray.8
However, such proclamations were soon to become more difficult,
or at least far less categorical. Two years after Gray, in Babcock v.
Jackson, the New York Court of Appeals launched what has since
become known as the American choice-of-law revolution.' One change
brought about by the revolution was that the choice of law should no
4. 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961).
5. Id. at 764.
6. 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (product liability action against a Japanese defendant who manufactured
a valve assembly in Japan and sold it to a Taiwanese manufacturer who incorporated the valve into a
motorcycle tire and sold it in California, where it exploded and injured the plaintiff).
7. See infra Part L.A.
8. 176 N.E.2d at 766.
9. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). For an extensive documentation and discussion of this
movement, see sYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE (2006) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION], and see also EUGENE F.
sCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 18-lo5 (4th ed.
2004).
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longer be based on rules, such as the lex loci delicti or, for that matter, a
single connecting factor, such as the place of conduct or the place of
injury.'0 Rather, the choice should be based on multiple factors, contacts,
and policies, including the policies embodied in the substantive laws of
the states involved in the conflict and their respective wishes or
"interests" in having their laws applied." Although this change has
increased the rationality quotient of choice-of-law decisions, it has also
increased their complexity while decreasing their predictability.
The revolution has also produced an abundance of new and
sophisticated scholarship, and this production continues unabated. What
has been missing, however, is a systematic study of how courts have
handled choice-of-law decisions during and since the revolution. Without
denying the important role of academic theory in the development of
American conflicts law-including the instigation and guidance of the
revolution-this Article turns the focus on the courts, where the stakes
are real (or at least higher). Four decades after the revolution, the time is
ripe to review the revolution's judicial output and contemplate the next
step.
A systematic study of judicial decisions is necessary, instructive, and
rewarding. It is necessary if only because, "right or wrong," court
decisions are the law-particularly in a field like conflicts, into which
legislatures rarely venture. As Professor Weintraub, one of the living
legends of American conflicts law, aptly stated, "[m]ore important than
what the commentators are up to as they deforest the land with their
mountains of conflicts articles, is the results that the courts are
reaching." 2 This Article focuses on these results in one important
category of conflicts cases-those involving cross-border torts and
decided during and since the revolution under approaches other than the
traditional lex loci delicti rule.'3
A study of judicial decisions is also instructive because there is a
great deal of wisdom to be gleaned from the law reports. As this Author
can attest from reading all choice-of-law decisions over the last two
decades," there is a qualitative difference between a selective reading
1o. See infra Part I.B.
i i. See infra Part I.B.
12. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 347 (4th ed. 2001).
13. For additional limitations to the scope of this Article, see infra notes 65-70 and accompanying
text. The lex loci delicti rule continues to be followed in the following ten states, with varying degrees
of commitment: Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at
50-62; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual
Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 279- 80 (2009) [hereinafter Symeonides, Choice of Law in American
Courts 2008]. Under this rule, courts invariably apply the law of the state of injury, regardless of the
content of that law or any other factors. See infra Part I.A.
14. For the last twenty years, this Author has been conducting an annual survey of choice-of-law
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and an all-inclusive reading of the cases. The former, especially when the
reader is searching merely for cases that support a particular theory, can
be misleading. The latter avoids such misimpressions and can provide a
more stable grounding for academic theory. In the words of an astute
observer of the American conflicts scene, "[w]e have been so busy
teaching the judges that we have not been learning from them."" This
Article is an attempt to acquire, and hopefully transmit, that knowledge.
Finally, a comprehensive study of the cases is rewarding because it
produces a more comprehensible and optimistic picture than a reading of
the academic literature. For example, although at first glance the above
complaint about unpredictability appears to be supported by the
malleability of the choice-of-law approaches emerging from the
revolution, a closer look at the results of judicial decisions leads to a
more encouraging assessment. It reveals that, regardless of the approach
they follow, and despite occasionally using verbose, platitudinous, or
impressionistic language, the courts that have joined the revolution tend
to reach fairly uniform results in several categories of tort conflicts. This
Author has documented this development in publications discussing
cases for the Section of Conflict of Laws of the Association of American Law Schools, a task which
entails reading more than a thousand cases per year. The surveys have been published in volumes 37
through 57 of the American Journal of Comparative Law. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law
in the American Courts in 1988, 37 AM. J. COMp. L. 457 (1989); P. John Kozyris & Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. COMp. L. 6o
(1990); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1993 (and in the Six Previous
Years), 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 599 (1994); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 1994: A View "From the Trenches," 43 AM. J. COMp. L. I (1995); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 1995: A Year in Review, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 181 (1996); Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth Annual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMp. L.
447 (1997); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1997, 46 AM. J. COMp. L
233 (1998); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1998: Twelfth Annual
Survey, 47 Am. J. COMp. L. 327 ('999); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in 1999: One More Year, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 143 (2ooo); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2ooo: As the Century Turns, 49 AM. J. COMp. L. I (2001); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2oo: Fifteenth Annual Survey, 5o AM. J. COMp. L. I (2002);
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth Annual Surve ,51
AM. J. Comp. L. I (2003); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003:
Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMp. L. 9 (2004); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2oo4: Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. CoMp. L. 919 (2004) [hereinafter
Symeonides, Eighteenth Annual Survey]; Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 2oo5: Nineteenth Annual Survey, 53 AM. J. COMp. L. 559 (2005); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2oo6: Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMp. L. 697
(2oo6); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2007: Twenty-First Annual
Survey, 56 AM. J. COMp. L. 243 (2oo8); Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts 2oo8, supra
note 13.
t5. Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MIrCH. L. REV. 1631, 1648 (2005)
(emphasis omitted) (reviewing SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOIcE-OF-LAw REVOUT-ION IN
THE COURTS: TODAY AND TOMORROW (2003)).
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other categories of tort conflicts.'6 This Article adds the cross-border
category, perhaps the most interesting of tort conflicts.
This Article also provides a survey of how foreign conflicts systems
resolve these conflicts. Unlike the traditional American system, these
systems recognized early on the difficulties these conflicts present and,
rather than locking themselves into inexorable rules, they opted for
flexible solutions, some of which are openly result-oriented." One
solution that has been gaining traction in recent years is to allow the
plaintiff to choose between the laws of the state of conduct and the state
of injury, or to authorize the court to choose whichever of the two laws
favors the plaintiff." Even by American standards, this solution may
appear "off the wall." Yet, as this Article documents, American courts
have reached precisely the same result. They have sometimes applied the
law of the state of conduct and sometimes the law of the state of injury,
but in most cases they have applied whichever law favored the plaintiff. 9
The difference is that the American results have come only after
prolonged and expensive litigation, to say nothing of reinventing the
wheel.
The findings of this Article may provide ammunition to "tort
reformers" and others who contend that American courts are too
"liberal" and eager to favor plaintiffs at any cost. 20 It is important to
reiterate, however, that this Article is limited to one category of tort
conflicts, and that previous studies of other categories of tort conflicts do
not confirm the perception of judicial plaintiff-favoritism." In any event,
16. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Resolving Punitive-Damages Conflicts, 5 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L
L. 1 (2003); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The 1990s and Beyond, 78
TUL. L. REV. 1247 (2004) [hereinafter Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability]; SYMEONIDES,
CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 141-364.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra notes 236-35 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. 25496 (2003) (statement of Sen. Chambliss) (recording available at
http://www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/7753i&id= I05531) ("Right now, magnet State courts
are trampling over the laws of other States in their zeal to certify nationwide class actions and help
enrich, frankly, the plaintiffs' trial bar. The Class Action Fairness Act. .. [will help] ensure that
magnet State court judges stop dictating national policies from their local courthouse steps."); George
F. Ball, Real Lessons of Cambridge Moment Is Injustice of Misapplied Empathy, INVESTORS.COM, July
30, 2009, http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=483773&Ntt=%E2%80%9CReal+
Lessons+of+Cambridge%E2%80%9D ("Every day in our tort system 'empathetic' judges make
decisions based on emotions or other non-relevant considerations that ultimately result in higher
prices for just about every product and service in this country, including medical care."); Christopher
Guadagnino, Malpractice Awards Surge in Pa., PHYSICIAN'S NEws DIGEST, Jan. 2001, available at http://
www.physiciansnews.com/cover/ioi.html ("Philadelphia judges 'bend over backward' for injured
parties, allowing cases to proceed even without adequate plaintiff experts and long after filing
deadlines have passed, says Paul Siegel. M.D.. president of the Philadelphia County Medical
Society.").
21. For example, in products-liability conflicts -which are not included in this Article even
though they involve cross-border torts-the cases that applied a pro-defendant law slightly outnumber
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the more interesting question-which the reader is urged to keep in mind
while reading the discussion of cases in this Article-is whether the
results reached in these cases can be justified on grounds other than their
plaintiff-favoring effect, such as whether the results adequately serve the
interests of the involved states or other pertinent choice-of-law
considerations.
The Article is divided into five parts. Part I explains (i) how the
traditional American choice-of-law system resolved cross-border torts,
(2) how the changes brought by the revolution affect the resolution of
tort conflicts in general, and (3) how courts following the revolution have
resolved tort conflicts other than those discussed in this Article. Part II
surveys the decisions of American courts in cross-border tort conflicts
throughout the last four decades.22 Part III summarizes the results of the
cases and compares them with the results of the traditional methodology
and one modern approach-Professor Brainerd Currie's interest
analysis. Part IV surveys domestic and foreign choice-of-law rules for
cross-border tort conflicts. Part V examines whether the results of the
cases can be compressed into new content-sensitive, result-selective
choice-of-law rules which would be free of the vices of the old rules and
would be easy for judges to apply. It answers the question in the
affirmative and, to prove the point, it offers three options for such rules.
I. PRELIMINARIES
A. THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN APPROACH TO CROSS-BORDER TORT
CONFLICTS
For many generations, most students of American conflicts law have
begun their study of the subject with an infamous case involving a cross-
border tort -Alabama Great Southern Rail Road Co. v. Carroll.2 In this
case, the negligent conduct of a train worker in Alabama caused injury to
a fellow worker working on the same train shortly after it entered the
neighboring state of Mississippi.24 The injured worker sued his employer
in Alabama and argued strenuously for the application of Alabama law,
which, unlike Mississippi law, permitted a tort action against the
the cases that applied a pro-plaintiff law. See Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability, supra
note 16, at 1314-16 (documenting that fifty-one percent of the cases covered by the study, which
covers a fifteen-year period, applied a pro-defendant law). Similarly, in intrastate tort conflicts,
namely, cases in which the conduct and the injury occurred in the same state but which involve a party
or parties from another state, American courts apply the law of a state that has certain contacts,
irrespective of whether that law favors the plaintiff or the defendant. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. The selection of cases is comprehensive but not exhaustive. While every effort has been made
to identify all relevant cases, there is no guarantee that the effort has been one hundred percent
successful.
23. iI So. 803, 807 (Ala. 1892).
24. Id. at 804.
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employer." The court opted for Mississippi law because that state was
the place of injury, reasoning that "there can be no recovery in one state
for injuries to the person sustained in another, unless the infliction of the
injuries is actionable under the law of the state in which they were
received." ,6
The court's choice-of-law syllogism was as questionable then as it
would be today. The court assumed that the plaintiff's right to recover
could only be determined by the law of the state in which "the fact which
is relied on to justify a recovery transpired"27 rather than, for example,
the state of the employment relationship or the parties' common
domicile. In this case, that "fact" was the injury, rather than the negligent
conduct, because "negligence of duty unproductive of damnifying results
will not authorize-... recovery. "8 The court then concluded that, (i)
because the injury occurred in Mississippi, "it was in that
state . . . necessarily that the cause of action, if any, arose";29 and (2)
because under Mississippi law, the plaintiff "had no cause of action,"30
the plaintiff had "no rights which [Alabama] courts can enforce."3
Four decades after Carroll, the drafters of the First Conflicts
Restatement, showing the same single mindedness as the Alabama court,
adopted the same solution by subjecting all cross-border torts to the law
of the place of injury.32 The Restatement provided that "the law of the
place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury," 33 and, if that law created a cause of action, "a cause of action will
be recognized in other states." 34 Otherwise, "no recovery in tort can be
had in any other state." 35 The "place of wrong" was defined as the state
in which "the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place."36 Then, in a futile attempt to provide absolute certainty,
the Restatement provided numerous minute localization sub-rules
defining the place of injury in various cross-border torts. For example, in
personal injury cases, the place of the injury was the place in which "the
harmful force takes effect upon the body," whereas in cases of poisoning
25. Id. at 805-06.
26. Id. at 805.
27. Id. at 8o6.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 807.
31. Id.
32. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). For a recent discussion of the
Restatement and the work of its drafter, Professor Joseph H. Beale, see Symeon C. Symeonides, The
First Conflicts Restatement Through the Eyes of Old: As Bad as Its Reputation?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 39,
57-59 (2007).
33. RESTATEMENr (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.
34. Id. § 384.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 377 (emphasis added).
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it was the place where "the deleterious substance takes effect."37 This is
the American version of the lex loci delicti rule, with its "last event"
subrule, which was followed throughout the United States until the
choice-of-law revolution began in the I96os.3"
B. THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION
The American choice-of-law revolution led to the gradual
abandonment of the lex loci delicti rule in forty-two out of fifty-two
jurisdictions.39 In its place, these jurisdictions substituted one or more of
the competing modern approaches, such as the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws of 1971, 40 Brainerd Currie's "governmental interest
analysis," 4' or Professor Leflar's "better law" approach.4 2 While these
approaches differ from one another, they also share one basic feature
that is antithetical to the single-mindedness of the lex loci delicti rule:
they all rely on multiple contacts, factors, and policies.43 Indeed, the
revolution attacked not only the lex loci rule as such, but also the very
premises and goals of the established choice-of-law system. All rules
were denounced in favor of "approaches";" issue-by-issue analysis and
dkpegage became terms du jour;45 "material justice" became an overt
goal;46 unilateralism was resurrected;" and the principle of territoriality
37. Id.
38. For a succinct discussion of the traditional American choice-of-law system, see SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-73 (2oo8).
39. The count includes the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. For a
chronology of the judicial revolution and case citations, see SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION,
supra note 9, at 38-43, 48. For the latest list, see Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts 2oo8
supra note 13, at 279-80.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (197).
41. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
42. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 270-327 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice Influencing Considerations, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1588, 1590-93 (1966).
43. For a succinct discussion of these approaches and their differences, see SYMEONIDES, supra
note 38, at 92-117. For their application in the various states, see SYMEONIDES. CHOICE-OF-LAW
REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 63-Ii6.
44. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 14,412-13. Unlike a choice-of-
law rule, which designates in advance the law applicable to a conflicts case, a choice-of-law "approach"
simply enumerates the factors that a judge should consider in choosing the applicable law on a case-
by-case basis. Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) is a typical example of an "approach." See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.
45. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 102-03, lo-0i. Depeqage is
the result of an "issue-by-issue analysis" of a conflicts case when the analysis leads to the application
of the laws of different states to different issues in the same cause of action. See id. at loo-oi.
46. See id. at 25-28, 8j-87, 404-I x. "Material justice" is juxtaposed with "conflicts justice," which
is the goal of traditional choice-of-law systems. That goal is to apply the law of the state that has the
most appropriate relationship with the case, regardless of the substantive quality of the result that law
produces. The "material justice" view rejects this goal and instead aims for the law that would produce
the most appropriate substantive result in the particular case. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Material
Justice and Conflicts Justice in Choice of Law, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD
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lost significant ground to personality, especially in contract conflicts.48
From the perspective of methodology, general philosophy, and even
terminology, the choice-of-law revolution has instigated significant and,
in many respects, beneficial changes.
Three of these changes are pertinent to the subject of this Article.
The first change was that the choice of the applicable law is no longer
based on a single contact, such as the place of the conduct or injury.
Instead, the choice is based on multiple contacts, including the parties'
domiciles or other affiliations with a particular state, or the place of their
pre-existing relationship, if any. 0
The second change was the acceptance of the notion that, prior to
choosing between the laws of the contact states, the court should
consider the content of these laws and their underlying policies, as well
as other policies and considerations, such as the needs of the interstate
and international systems." Thus, the choice of law moved from
"jurisdiction-selection" to a content-oriented law selection-that is, from
the selection of a state without regard to the content of its substantive
law 2 to the selection of a state's law based in part on that law's content."
The third change was the emergence of a distinction between tort
rules whose primary purpose is to deter injurious conduct (hereinafter
"conduct-regulating rules") and those whose primary purpose is to
allocate the economic and social losses resulting from the tort
(hereinafter "loss-allocating" or "loss-distributing" rules).54 This
MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER 125, 125, 126-28 (Patrick J. Borchers &
Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001).
47. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 369-77. For the difference
between "unilateralism" and "multilateralism" (or "bilateralism"), see Symeon C. Symeonides,
Accommodative Unilateralism as a Starting Premise in Choice of Law, in BALANCING OF INTERESTS:
LIBER AMICORUM PETER HAY 417, 417-30 (2005).
48. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9 at 386-89; Symeon C.
Symeonides, Territoriality and Personality in Tort Conflicts, in INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION
THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER NYGH 401 (Talia Einhorn & Kurt
Siehr eds., 2004).
49. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 420-21.
50. See id. at 99, 101-02.
51. See id. 11-13, 32, 394-404.
52. The term "jurisdiction-selection" was first coined by Professor David Cavers. See David F.
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 173 ('933). For the difference
between jurisdiction-selection and content-oriented law-selection and their symbiosis in contemporary
American conflicts law, see SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 394-404.
53. For a full discussion of these concepts, see Symeon C. Symeonides, American Conflicts Law at
the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. I, 46-60 (2000).
54. In the words of the New York Court of Appeals, conduct-regulating rules are those that
"have the prophylactic effect of governing conduct to prevent injuries from occurring." See Padula v.
Lilarn Properties Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. '994). Loss-distributing rules are those that
"prohibit, assign, or limit liability after the tort occurs." Id at 1003. The distinction, which is discussed
in detail in SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 123-40, corresponds to the two
general objectives of torts-law: deterrence and reparation or compensation. while each rule of tort law
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distinction, first articulated in New York in the landmark case Babcock
v. Jackson" and later followed in other states," facilitates choice-of-law
analysis by pointing the court in the right direction. It amounts to a
presumption that conduct-regulating rules are territorially oriented,
while loss-distributing rules are not necessarily so oriented."
Consequently, territorial contacts (i.e., the places of conduct and injury)
remain relevant in conduct-regulation conflicts, while both territorial and
personal contacts (e.g., the parties' domiciles) are relevant in loss-
distribution conflicts.
While all three of these changes were necessary and have been
beneficial, they have also dramatically increased the complexity of
choice-of-law analysis. Fortunately, when one looks beyond
methodology and language and focuses on substantive outcomes in tort
conflicts, the picture becomes clearer. At least in certain categories of
cases, courts have produced fairly uniform results. These categories of
cases are depicted in Table i and described in the text below.
serves both objectives to some extent, some rules serve primarily one objective and only secondarily
the other. Examples of conduct-regulating rules include not only "rules of the road," like speed limits
and traffic-light rules, but also rules prescribing the civil sanctions for violating rules of the road,
including presumptions and inferences attached to the violation; rules prescribing safety standards for
work sites, buildings, and other premises; rules imposing punitive damages; and rules defining as
tortious certain anticompetitive conduct, or conduct amounting to "interference with contract,"
"interference with marriage," or "alienation of affections." Examples of loss-distributing rules include
not only guest statutes, which are now virtually extinct, but also rules that prescribe the amount of
compensatory damages, rules of interspousal immunity, parent-child immunity, worker's
compensation immunity, and loss of consortium.
55. 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963).
56. For citations, see SYMEONIDES, CHOIcE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9. at 127-29-
57. See id. at 125-29, 139-40.
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TABLE I. THE THREE MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TORT CONFLICTS
# P's Dom Injury Conduct D's Dom
Common-domicile I A b B A
cases 2 A b X A
Loss-distribution 3 a B B a
issues 4 a B X a
Split-domicile 5 A A A b
intrastate torts 6 a a A B
Loss-distribution 7 a B B B
or conduct 8 A b B b
regulation issues 9 x A A B
Io X a A b
Cross-border torts II - a B -
(Discussed in this 12 a a B B
Article) 13 A B
14 A A B b
_r. Common-Domicile Cases
These cases involve torts in which both the tortfeasor and the victim
are domiciled in one state, and in which the injurious conduct and the
resulting injury occur in another state, or states. (See cases i through 4,
in Table i.) Most of the cases (thirty-two out of forty-two) in which an
American court of last resort abandoned the lex loci delicti rule involved
this pattern, and all but one of them applied the law of the parties'
common domicile, regardless of whether that law favored the victim (see
cases i and 2) or the tortfeasor (see cases 3 and 4)59 However, in all of
these cases, the conflict was confined to loss-distribution issues.6In
58. As used in this Table and hereinafter: The term "defendant" (abbreviated "D") denotes the
person whose conduct is claimed to have caused a tortious injury (the tortfeasor). The term "plaintiff"'
(abbreviated "P") denotes the victim of the tort. The term "pro-defendant law" denotes a law which,
on the disputed issue, favors the defendant, such as a law that does not consider tortious the
defendant's conduct, immunizes the defendant from suit, provides exculpatory defenses, or disallows
or limits certain types of damages. The term "pro-plaintiff law' denotes a law which, on the disputed
issue, favors the plaintiff, such as a law that declares tortious the defendant's conduct, disallows certain
defenses by the defendant, allows punitive damages, or provides higher compensatory damages than
the law or laws of the other involved state. The abbreviations "P's Dom" and "D's Dom" denote the
home states of the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively. The words "conduct" and "injury" denote,
respectively, the state of the injurious conduct and the state in which the resulting injury occurred. The
use of capital letters in the last four columns of the Table indicates that the state represented by that
column has a pro-plaintiff law. Lower-case letters indicate a pro-defendant law. The shaded cells
represent the state whose law has been applied in the majority of cases falling within the particular
patterns.
59. For documentation and discussion of these cases, see SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAW
REvOLUTION, supra note 9. at 145-59.
6o. Also, most of those cases involved intrastate torts (like those portrayed in rows Iand 3 of
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contrast, when the conflict is limited to conduct-regulation issues, courts
do not apply the law of the parties' common domicile; rather they apply
the law of the state of conduct and injury in intrastate torts,6 and the law
of either the state of conduct or the state of injury in cross-border torts,
as explained in Parts II and III.6
2. Split-Domicile Intrastate Torts
These cases involve torts in which the parties are domiciled in
different states but both the conduct and the injury occur in the same
state (see cases 5 through io). In most of these cases, the latter state is
also the domicile of either the tortfeasor or the victim (see cases 5
through 8). When that is the case, courts tend to apply the law of that
state, regardless of whether it favors the tortfeasor (see cases 6 and 8) or
the victim (see cases 5 and 7), and regardless of whether the conflict
involves conduct-regulation or loss-distribution issues. Courts also tend
to apply the same law even in the less-common cases in which the state of
conduct and injury does not coincide with the domicile of either party
(see cases 9 and io), although exceptions are possible if the conflict
involves only loss-distribution issues and that state's contacts are
transient or otherwise fortuitous.64
3. Cross-Border Torts
These are cases in which the injurious conduct occurs in one state
and the resulting injury in another (see cases ii through 14). This Article
discusses cross-border torts, other than the following: (a) cross-border
torts involving loss-distribution issues in which both parties are domiciled
in the same third state (see cases 2 and 4) or in states whose laws produce
the same outcome, 65 (b) cross-border torts in which the laws of the state
of conduct and the state of injury produce the same outcome,6 6 (c)
products-liability cases,67 and (d) class action cases."
Table i) in which the conduct and injury occurred in the same state other than the state of the parties'
common domicile. However, by parity of reasoning, the law of the parties' common domicile would
also apply in cross-border cases such as those portrayed in rows 2 and 4 of the Table.
61. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 213-20.
62. See infra Parts II-III. In loss-distribution conflicts in which the parties are domiciled in
different states that have the same law on the disputed issue, courts tend to apply the law of the
domicile of either party. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 159-62.
63. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 163-91 (loss-distribution
conflicts); id. at 213-20 (conduct-regulation conflicts).
64. See id. at 202-07 (loss-distribution conflicts); id. at 213-20 (conduct-regulation conflicts).
65. The reason for excluding these cases is because, as noted above, they are governed either by
the law of the parties' common domicile or by the law of the domicile of one of the parties. See supra
Part I.B.I; supra note 62.
66. The reason for excluding these cases is because they are a species of false conflict in the sense
that it makes no difference which of the two laws the court applies.
67. The reason for excluding products liability conflicts is because their resolution is often based
on additional factors or contacts, such as the place of the product's acquisition, which are not present
in other cross-border torts. For a comprehensive discussion of products-liability conflicts cases from
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A total of 105 cases fall within these parameters. Unfortunately,
space limitations do not allow a full discussion of these cases here. In lieu
of such a discussion, which interested readers can find in a longer version
of this Article posted on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN),"
this version simply depicts these cases in several tables and then provides
very abbreviated summaries.
II. CROSS-BORDER TORT CONFLICTS AFTER THE REVOLUTION
The cross-border tort conflicts that fall within the scope of this
Article can be divided into two principal patterns (depicted in Table 2,
below):
(i) Cases in which the state of conduct has a law that favors the
plaintiff (pro-plaintiff law), while the state of injury has a law that favors
the defendant (pro-defendant law) (Pattern i); and
(2) Cases in which the state of conduct has a pro-defendant law,
while the state of injury has a pro-plaintiff law (Pattern 2)."
TABLE 2. PATTERNS IN CROss-BORDER TORTS INVOLVING Two STATES
Plaintiff's State of State of Defendant's Currie's
Domicile injury Conduct Domicile Classification
ia Conduct a B False conflict
ib Loss distribution a a B B Unprovided-for
2a Conduct A b True conflict
2b Loss distribution A A b b True conflict
Table 2 subdivides each pattern into conduct-regulation and loss-
distribution conflicts because this distinction determines the classification
of a particular conflict into the three categories of conflicts (shown in the
last column) established by Professor Currie's interest analysis," which
remains the lingua franca of the choice-of-law revolution.
1990 to 2004, see generally Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability, supra note 16.
68. The reason for excluding class-action cases is because most of these cases discuss the choice-
of-law issue only in a tentative and often incomplete fashion in the preliminary context of class
certification. See Symeonides. Eighteenth Annual Survey, supra note 14, at 988-89; infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
69. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts (Jan. 14. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1328191.
70. If the two states have the same law on the particular issue, then there is no conflict between
those two states, although there may well be a conflict with the law of a third state. These cases are not
discussed here. Suffice it to say that, if the conflict involves only conduct-regulation issues, courts tend
to apply the law of either the state of conduct or the state of injury, rather than the law of the third
state. See sYMEON'IDES. CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 220--23.
71. See CUJRRIE, Supra note 41.
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The four middle columns represent the states that have the
pertinent contacts. In these columns, the use of a capital letter indicates
that the state represented by that column has a pro-plaintiff law, and the
use of a lower-case letter indicates a state with a pro-defendant law.
In loss-distribution conflicts, the table shows the parties' domiciles
using the most common scenario-the one in which the defendant is
domiciled in the state of conduct and the plaintiff in the state of injury. In
rows ia and 2a, which represent conduct-regulation conflicts of patterns
i and 2, respectively, the columns representing the parties' domiciles are
intentionally left blank because, as a general proposition, a party's
domicile is not a decisive factor in conduct-regulation conflicts. 2 That is
not to say that domicile is a wholly irrelevant contact. For example, if the
state of either the conduct or the injury is also the domicile of either
party, this contact may provide additional support for applying that
state's conduct-regulating rule. However, it is also true that: (a) the state
of the conduct or the injury has an interest in enforcing its conduct-
regulating rules even if neither party is domiciled in that state; and (b)
this interest overrides any contrary interest of any third state, such as a
state in which both parties are domiciled.73
72. For numerous cases adopting this proposition and focusing instead on the interests of the
state or states of conduct and injury, see SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at
213-33; infra note 73.
73. For matters of conduct-regulation, "[t]he maxim 'When in Rome do as the Romans do'
bespeaks the common sense view that it is the traveler who must adjust." Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d
639, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Williams, J., concurring). A state has an interest in applying its conduct-
regulating rules to conduct or injury occurring within its territory, even if neither the actor nor the
victim is domiciled there. Conversely, a foreigner may not claim exemption from these rules and, when
injured by conduct that violates them, a foreigner may not be denied the benefit of their protection.
Countless cases have adopted these propositions and have held that the interests of the state of injury
or conduct overrides any interests of the foreigner's home state. See, e.g., Carris v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.,
466 F-3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2oo6) (if personal injury claims of hotel guests against hotel operators
were subject to the tort of each guest's home state, "[t]he burden of compliance would be staggering,
especially since different countries, having different ideas about safety, might impose inconsistent tort
duties. One jurisdiction might think the absence of airbags from vehicles negligent: another might
think their presence negligent because of the danger to children. So how would a hotel equip its
airport shuttle van?"); Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We doubt
that [the Illinois plaintiff] would have thought he was carrying his domiciliary law with him, like a
turtle's house, to every foreign country he visited.... [H]e would not, eating dinner with a Mexican in
Acapulco, feel himself cocooned in Illinois law, like citizens of imperial states in the era of colonialism
who were granted extraterritorial privileges in weak or dependent states."); Brooks v. Gen. Cas. Co. of
Wis., No. o6-C-o996, 2007 WL 4305577, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2007) (holding that it would constitute
"officious intermeddling" to apply the law of the guest's home state rather than the law of the state in
which the hotel was located); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., No. oI-C-8882, 2003 WL 22317425, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 09, 2003) ("Plaintiffs cannot reasonably expect that a foreign state's law will govern
the allocation of any possible damages award in a single-car incident merely because an accident
fortuitously occurs outside of Illinois, but they know they are subject to the traffic laws of another
state when driving in that state."); Bonelli v. Giguere, 2004 WVL 424089, at *2-.*3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Feb. i8, 2004) (finding that New York rule allowing evidence of non-use of seat-belt was a "regulatory
law specifically aimed at drivers traveling upon New York roadways," and thus New York had "no
352 [Vol. 61:337
WHY PLAINTIFFS WIN AND SHOULD
A. PATTERN I: CONDUCT IN STATE WITH PRO-PLAINTIFF LAW AND INJURY
IN STATE WITH PRO-DEFENDANT LAW
In cases falling within Pattern i, the conduct occurs in a state whose
law favors the plaintiff and the injury occurs in another state whose law
favors the defendant. Under the traditional lex loci delicti rule, all such
cases would be decided under the pro-defendant law of the state of
injury, unless the court would be willing and able to evade the rule by
utilizing any of the escape devices courts have employed for this
purpose. 4 The choice-of-law revolution, which ended the reign of lex loci
as the exclusive and inexorable rule, freed courts to apply either the law
of the state of injury or the law of the state of conduct (and, potentially,
the law of a third state). As the cases surveyed here indicate, most courts
that joined the revolution have opted for the law of the state of conduct
in Pattern i cases, under a variety of rationales.
From the perspective of academic theory (though not necessarily
from the courts' perspective), Pattern i cases are subdivided into those in
which the conflict is confined to conduct-regulation issues (Pattern ia)
and those in which the conflict is confined to loss-distribution issues
(Pattern ib). As explained below, Pattern ia presents the false conflict
paradigm because only one state has an "interest" in applying its law,
while Pattern ib arguably presents the so-called "no interest" paradigm
because nether state has an interest in applying its law. In practice, this
difference has not had an appreciable bearing on the outcome of cases;
courts have opted for the pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct at
approximately the same rate in both Pattern ia and Pattern ib."
i. Conduct-Regulation Conflicts: The False Conflict Paradigm
(Pattern ia)
Under the assumptions and terminology of interest analysis, if a
Pattern i case involves only conduct-regulation issues -such as when the
conduct state considers the particular conduct tortious and the injury
state does not-then the case presents the false conflict paradigm
regardless of where the parties are domiciled.76 On the one hand, the
interest in the application of this law beyond its borders" on Connecticut roads. Connecticut had the
exclusive interest in applying its own "regulatory laws regarding roadway travel" in Connecticut);
Bertram v. Norden, 823 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (finding that Michigan had the exclusive
interest in applying its assumption-of-risk rule to Michigan snowmobile accident involving two Ohio
domiciliaries).
74. For the use of these "escape devices," like characterization, ordre public, or renvoi under the
traditional system, see SYMEONIDES, supra note 38, at 74-85.
75. See infra pp. 355-56 tbl. 3 (showing that thirty-four out of forty-one cases (or eighty-three
percent) applied the pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct); infra p. 362 tbl. 4 (showing that thirteen
out of sixteen cases (or eighty-one percent) applied the pro-plaintiff law of the state of injury).
76. The term "false conflict" was first advanced by the chief architect of interest analysis,
Professor Brainerd Currie. See CURRIE, suprai note 41, at 180. False conflicts are those in which only
one of the involved states has an interest in applying its own law. See id. at xo'7-lo, i80, 189. In
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conduct state has an undeniable interest in applying its conduct-
regulating rule in order to police and deter conduct occurring within its
territory and violating its law, even if the injury occurs outside its
borders. Indeed, the effectiveness of this rule is undermined if it is not
applied to out-of-state injuries. On the other hand, the state of injury has
no clear interest in applying its more lenient conduct-regulating rule
because that rule is designed to protect conduct within, not outside, that
state. In other words, the application of the stricter conduct-regulating
rule of the conduct state promotes the policy of that state in policing
conduct within its borders-without subordinating the (non-implicated)
policies embodied in the less strict rule of the state of injury. Moreover,
there is nothing unfair in subjecting a tortfeasor to the law of the state in
which he acted. Having violated the standards of that state, the tortfeasor
should bear the consequences of such violation and should not be
allowed to invoke the lower standards of another state.
D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. 7 is one of many cases
illustrating the proposition that a state's interest in deterring prohibited
conduct within its territory is not diminished when the conduct causes
injury in another state whose law considers that conduct lawful. In
D'Agostino, the wroniful conduct occurred in New Jersey and caused
injury in Switzerland.' Executives of a New Jersey-based corporation
allegedly "orchestrated" the retaliatory firing of an employee of their
wholly-owned Swiss subsidiary for refusing to bribe Swiss officials in
charge of regulating the licensing of pharmaceuticals in Switzerland." If
proven, this conduct would violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
which New Jersey cases had incorporated into New Jersey law." Under
Swiss law, the alleged bribes would be considered "consulting fees" and
would be lawful, as would the employee's firing.8
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey law should
govern the employee's action against the executives." The court noted
that, although Switzerland had an interest in regulating the employment
relationship between a Swiss company and a Swiss resident, Switzerland
did "not have an interest in condoning corporate bribery orchestrated
beyond its boundaries.""3 In any event, New Jersey's interests in
deterring wrongful conduct in New Jersey "outweigh[ed] the Swiss
interest in the at-will employment relationship that would not seek to
contrast "true conflicts" are those in which both (or more) of the involved states have such an interest.
See id. at 18o.
77. 628 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1993).
78. Id. at 307-o8.
79. Id. at 308.
So. Id. at 307.
8'1. ld.
82. Id. at 321.
83. Id. at 316.
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deter such conduct through its civil law."8 4 The court emphasized that its
decision was "not exporting New Jersey employment law so much as
applying New Jersey domestic policy ... to a domestic company"0 and
"regulating the conduct of parent companies in New Jersey that engage
in corrupt practices through a subsidiary's employees."8 The court
concluded that the strength of New Jersey's commitment to deterring
commercial bribery, "which could have a negative impact on public
health and safety in New Jersey,"X coupled with the "extensive New
Jersey contacts,"8 outweighed "[a]ny opposing interest involving
extraterritoriality."5 9
This study has identified forty more conduct-regulation conflicts of
the same pattern as D'Agostino. Table 3, below, depicts those cases. As
the table indicates, thirty-four of the forty-one cases (eighty-three
percent) have applied the pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct rather
than the pro-defendant law of the state of injury. Most of the thirty-four
cases have followed reasoning similar to that of the D'Agostino court.
TABLE 3. CONDUCT-REGULATION CONFLICTS ARISING FROM CONDUCT
IN STATE WITH PRO-PLAINTIFF LAW AND INJURY IN STATE WITH PRO-
DEFENDANT LAW (PATTERN IA)"
States' Contacts and Laws
# Case name Forum P's dom Injury Conduct D's dom
- Pro-D Pro-P
i D'Agostino v. J. NJ SWS SWS NJ NJ
2 In re Stapleton CO Many CO TX TX
3 Jackson v. Travellers IA NE NE IA IA
4 Cunnincham v. PFL IA Many Many IA IA
5 Ardoyno v. Kyzar LA LA LA MS MS
6 Fanselow v. Rice NE TX NE MN MN
7 Bryant v. Silverman AZ AZ/NM CO AZ AZ
8 Schmidt v. Driscoll MN MN WI MN MN
9 Rong Yao Zhou DC DC MD DC DC
io Patton v. Carnrike NY PA PA NY NY
84. Id. at 307.
85. Id. at 3 IS.
86. Id. at 311.
87. Id. at 315.
88. Id. at316.
89. Id. at 315-
90. This Table and subsequent tables list the case name, the forum state, and the states that had
the tour basic contacts-namely, the plaintiffs domicile and injury, and the defendant's conduct and
domicile. The shaded cells indicate the state whose law the court applied.
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Forum
States' Contacts and Laws
P's dom Injury Conduct
- Pro-D Pro-P
D's dom
ii Rutledge v. Rock. NY CT CT NY NY
12 Bankord v. De Rock IA MN 10 IO
13 Trapp v. 4-oInv. ND MN MN ND ND
14 Johnson v. Yates OK NM TX OK OK
15 Gaither v. Myers DC MD MD DC DC
16 Burney v. PV Holding MI AL AL MI MI
17 Veasley v. CRST IA IA AZ IA IA
'8 Garcia v. Plaza PA PA PA NY NY
19 Sexton v. Ryder MI MI VA MI MI
20 Farber v. Smolack NY NY NC NY NY
21 McKinney v. S & S NJ NJ NJ NY NY
22 Lindsay v. Toyota NJ NJ GA NY NY
23 White v. Smith NJ PA NJ NY NY
24 Dolan v. Sea Transfer NJ NY NJ NY NJ
25 Maffatone v. Woodson NJ NY NJ NY NY
26 Aponte v. Baez CT PR PA CT CT
27 Crowell v. Clay FL FL GA FL FL
28 Stallworth v. Hosp. FL FL LA FL FL
29 Oliver v. Davis LA LA LA FL FL
3> Erickson v. Hertz MN MN NC FL FL
31 Stathis v. National MA MA MA ME ME
32 Newcomb v. Haywood MA MA MA RI RI
33 Arias v. Figueroa NJ NJ NJ NY NY
34 Kim v. Enterprise NJ NJ NJ NY WA
35 Perkins v. Dynasty TX AUS TX FL CA
36 Roper v. Team Fleet NY NY PA CT IL
37 Value Rent v. Harbert FL GA GA FL FL
38 Pittman v. Maldania DE PA_ PA DE DE
DC MI
VT NY
UT AZ
MI
NY
DC DC
VT VT
AZ UT UT
The first six cases listed after D'Agostino (cases 2 through 7)
involved conflicting punitive-damages laws, which are par excellence
conduct-regulating. In all six cases, the state of conduct (which was also
Case name
39
4()
411
Tri-State v. U.S.-
Marra v. IushIcc
Williams v. Jeffs
I f I
- i i i i i
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the defendant's domicile) imposed punitive damages but the state of
injury did not. In terms of interest analysis, these cases present the false
conflict paradigm. The first state has an interest in applying its punitive-
damages law in order to punish the tortfeasor who engaged in egregious
conduct in that state, and to deter others similarly situated. In contrast,
the state of injury does not have an interest in applying its non-punitive-
damages law because that law is designed to protect tortfeasors who are
either domiciled in, or act in, that state, neither of which is the case here.
Thus, the application of the law of the conduct state promotes the
deterrence policies of that state without impairing the defendant-
protecting policies of the state of injury. As Table 3 indicates, all six cases
imposed punitive damages under the law of the state of conduct."
The next seven cases (cases 8 through 14) involved "dram-shop
acts," which the courts characterized as conduct-regulating. Dram-shop
acts impose civil liability on the owner of a tavern (dram shop) or other
similar establishment for injuries caused by an intoxicated patron to
whom the owner furnished alcohol. In cases that fall under this pattern,
the owner's conduct-namely, the furnishing of alcohol to the patron-
occurs in a state that has a dram-shop act (or similar rule) imposing
liability on the owner, while the injury occurs in a state that does not
impose such liability. This difference produces only a false conflict in
which the conduct state has an interest in deterring and policing conduct
that occurred within its territory and violated its law, while the state of
injury does not have a countervailing interest in applying its non-liability
rule to protect out-of-state tavern owners who violate the laws of their
state. As Table 3 indicates, six of the seven cases applied the dram-shop
act of the conduct state92 and one case applied the nonliability rule of the
91. See Fanselow v. Rice, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1o84-86 (D. Neb. 2002) (imposing punitive
damages under Minnesota law on a Minnesota employer of a truck driver who caused an accident in
Nebraska, which prohibited punitive damages); Cunningham v. PFL Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 872,
892 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (imposing punitive damages under Iowa law on Iowa defendant who engaged in
bad faith insurance practices in Iowa and caused injuries to insureds domiciled in several states);
Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1163 (S.D. Iowa 1998) (imposing punitive damages
under Iowa law in case involving bad faith insurance practices that took place in Iowa and caused
injury in Nebraska, which prohibited punitive damages); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l
Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1453 (D. Colo. 1988) (imposing punitive damages under Texas law on
airline whose airplane crashed in Colorado; Texas was the airline's principal place of business and the
place of the conduct most likely responsible for the crash; Colorado did not allow punitive damages in
wrongful death actions); Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78, 83-84 (E.D. La. 1976) (imposing punitive
damages under Mississippi law in a slander action by a Louisiana plaintiff against a Mississippi
defendant who made defamatory statements about the plaintiff in Mississippi and caused injury in
both states); see also Bryant v. Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1195-97 (Ariz. 1985) (imposing punitive
damages under the law of Arizona, which was the defendant airline's principal place of business,
without resolving the factual question of whether the critical conduct had also occurred in Arizona or,
as the defendant argued, in Colorado, where the defendant's airplane crashed; Colorado did not allow
punitive damages).
92. See Trapp v. 4-1o Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d r26i, 1264-65 (8th Cir. 1970) (Minnesota accident and
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state of injury-which, however, was also the state where part of the
conduct occurred. 93
Slightly more than half of the cases in this pattern (a total of twenty-
three, cases 15 through 37) involved car-owner liability statutes or similar
common-law rules imposing vicarious civil liability on car owners
(including car-rental companies) for injuries caused by a driver who used
the car with the owner's consent.94 In Pattern I cases, the conduct-state-
namely, the state in which the owner entrusts the car to the driver-
imposes such liability, while the state of the injury does not. Eighteen of
the twenty-three cases applied the pro-plaintiff liability rule of the
victim, North Dakota tavern and dram shop act); Patton v. Carnrike, 51o F. Supp. 625, 63o (N.D.N.Y.
1981) (applying New York law imposing liability on a New York alcohol vendor who sold alcohol to a
Pennsylvania minor who drove back to Pennsylvania and caused an accident there; refusing to apply
Pennsylvania's parental supervision defense); Bankord v. DeRock, 423 F. Supp. 602, 6o6 (N.D. Iowa
1976) (Minnesota accident and victim, Iowa tavern and dram shop act); Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Rest.,
Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1270-71 (D.C. 1987) (applying the District of Columbia's dram shop act imposing
liability on a D.C. tavern owner whose drunk patron caused an accident in Maryland; Maryland did
not impose liability); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn. 1957) (applying
Minnesota's dram shop act imposing liability on a Minnesota tavern owner whose drunk patron caused
an accident in Wisconsin, injuring plaintiff, also a Minnesota resident; Wisconsin did not have a dram-
shop act); Rutledge v. Rockwells of Bedford, Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 179, 18o-8 (App. Div. 1994)
(applying New York's dram shop act imposing liability on a New York tavern owner whose drunk
patron caused an accident in Connecticut). For an admiralty case, see Quinn v. St. Charles Gaming
Co., 815 So. 2d 963, 968 (La. Ct. App. 2002), which held that federal law, which imposed liability on
tavern owner, preempted Louisiana law, which did not impose such liability; the service of alcohol
occurred on a river boat casino while on navigable waters and the injury occurred on land in
Louisiana.
93. See Johnson v. Yates, No. 94-6041, 1994 WL 596874, at *2-3 (xoth Cir. Nov. 2, 1994) (decided
under Oklahoma conflicts law). In Yates, the defendants, Oklahoma residents, were passengers in a
pickup truck driven by another Oklahoma resident and purchased their first round of beer in
Oklahoma and the second round in Texas. Id. at *1. In the latter state, the pickup truck collided with a
car occupied by three New Mexico residents, two of whom were killed. Id. The victims' families sued
the passengers of the pickup truck in federal district court in Oklahoma for negligence in furnishing
beer to the driver. Id. The defendants would have been liable under Oklahoma law, but not under
Texas law. Id. at *2-3, The court concluded that Texas had the most significant relationship, chiefly
because the injury and much of the conduct had occurred in that state. Id.
94. While most cases characterize these statutes as conduct-regulating, see, e.g., Svege v.
Mercedes Benz Credit Corp.. i82 F. Supp. 2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2002), some cases characterize them
as loss-distributing. These cases are discussed infra note 113. A preempting federal statute enacted in
aoo5 released car rental companies from vicarious liability but did not do so for other car owners. See
49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2006).
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conduct state,95 and five cases applied the pro-defendant nonliability rule
of the state of injury.
95. See Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 216, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying New
York's car-owner liability statute to case arising from an accident in Pennsylvania, which did not have
such a statute); Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (applying D.C. rule imposing
civil liability on car owner who left his car unlocked and unattended in action arising from Maryland
accident caused by the defendant's apparently stolen car; Maryland law did not impose liability);
Aponte v. Baez, No. CVooo802893, 2002 WL 241456, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2002)
(applying Connecticut's car-owner liability statute to case arising out of a Pennsylvania accident that
injured a Puerto Rico victim and involved a car rented in Connecticut; Pennsylvania did not impose
liability); Veasley v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Iowa 1996) (applying Iowa's car-owner
statute to case arising from an accident in Arizona, which did not have such a statute); Sexton v. Ryder
Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 856 (Mich. 1982) (applying Michigan's car-owner liability statute
to case involving a truck leased in Michigan and arising from an accident in Virginia, which did not
have such a statute,); Burney v. P V Holding Corp., 553 N.W.2d 657, 659-6o (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(applying Michigan's car-owner statute to case in which the driver rented the car in Michigan and
caused an accident in Alabama, a state that did not have such a statute). Other cases have applied New
York's car-owner liability statute in actions arising from accidents occurring in states that did not
impose liability on the car owner and caused by a car rented or loaned in New York. See Lindsay v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc., Nos. 04 Civ. 10137 (NRB), 05 Civ. 943 (NRB), 2005 WL 2030311, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2005) (Georgia accident, New York victim); McKinney v. S & S Trucking, Inc.
885 F. Supp. 105, 107-o8 (D.N.J. 1995) (New Jersey accident, New Jersey victim); White v. Smith, 398
F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (D.N.J. 1975) (New Jersey accident, Pennsylvania victim); Dolan v. Sea Transfer
Corp., 942 A.2d 29, 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2oo8) (New Jersey accident, New York victim);
Maffatone v. Woodson, 240 A.2d 693, 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (New Jersey accident, New
York victim); Farber v. Smolack, 229 N.E.2d 36, 38-39 (N.Y. 1967) (North Carolina accident involving
New York parties); Ames v. Cross, 575 N.Y.S.2d 991, 992-93 (App. Div. 1991) (Virginia accident, New
York victim). Cases have also applied Florida's car-owner liability rule in actions arising from
accidents occurring in states that did not impose liability on the car owner and caused by cars rented or
loaned in Florida. See, e.g, Erickson v. Hertz Corp., No. Civ. 05-1690, 2006 WL 1004385, at *5 (D.
Minn. Apr. 17, 2oo6) (North Carolina accident, Minnesota victims); Crowell v. Clay Hyder Trucking
Lines, Inc., 700 So. 2d 120, 123-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Georgia accident, Florida victims);
Stallworth v. Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 515 So. 2d 413, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Louisiana
accident, Florida victims); Oliver v. Davis, 679 So. 2d 462, 466-68 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (Louisiana
accident, Louisiana victim); see also Stathis v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 1o9 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D. Mass.
2000) (applying Maine's car-owner liability statute to case arising from a Massachusetts accident
injuring Massachusetts domiciliary and involving a car rented in Maine; Massachusetts law did not
impose liability); Newcomb v. Haywood, No. o-o261, 2003 WL 138404, at *2-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan.
8, 2003) (applying Rhode Island's car-owner liability statute to case arising from a Massachusetts
accident injuring Massachusetts domiciliary and involving a car rented in Rhode Island; Massachusetts
law did not impose liability); Kline v. McCorkle, 330 F. Supp. 1089, 1091-92 (E.D. Va. 1971) (decided
under North Carolina conflicts law; characterizing as contractual the action of the victim of a North
Carolina accident against a New York car-rental company and applying New York statute imposing
liability; North Carolina did not impose liability on car owner).
96. See Value Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Harbert, 720 So. 2d 552, 554-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds action of Georgia domiciliary injured in Georgia by car
rented in Florida from a Florida car-rental company; stating that Florida's car-owner liability rule
would not have been applicable); Arias v. Figueroa, 93o A.2d 472, 476-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007) (applying New Jersey's nonliability rule to a case arising from a New Jersey accident injuring a
New Jersey domiciliary; the car-rental transaction took place in New York, the law of which imposed
liability on the company): Kim v. Paccar Fin. Corp., 896 A.2d 489. 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)
(applying New Jersey's nonliability rule to case arising from New Jersey accident injuring New Jersey
domiciliary and caused by truck rented in New York, the law of which imposed liability on the
Washington car owner); Roper v. Team Fleet Fin. Corp., No. 26591/2001, 2006 WL 288699, at *6 (N.Y.
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The remaining four cases in Table 3 (cases 38 through 41) involved
issues of malicious prosecution,9 providing prohibited equipment to
minors,98 and alienation of affections." Three of the four cases applied
the pro-plaintiff law of the conduct state," while one case applied the
pro-defendant law of the state of injury."'
In addition to the cases listed above, several class-action cases
(which fall outside the scope of this Article) have held that the pro-
plaintiff law of the state of conduct should govern the consumer fraud
claims of plaintiffs injured and domiciled in other states0 2 or countries.'"
Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2oo6) (applying Pennsylvania's nonliability law to case arising from Pennsylvania
accident injuring New York passenger and caused by a car rented in Connecticut from an Illinois
company; Illinois law did not impose liability on the car owner; the court did not consider Connecticut
law); Perkins v. Dynasty Group Auto, No. o8-oi-004 93 -CV, 2003 WL 2281o452, at *4 (Tex. App. Nov.
25, 2003) (finding that critical conduct occurred in Texas and applying Texas' non-liability rule to case
arising from Texas accident injuring Australian passenger of car owned by California dealer and
entrusted to Swedish tourist to drive from Florida to California; Florida law would hold the dealer
liable).
97. See Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, No. 00-01463 (HHK), 2007 WL 2007 5 87 , at
*5-6 (D.D.C. July 6, 2007) (Federal Tort Claims Act case decided under D.C. conflicts law; applying
D.C.'s pro-plaintiff law, rather than Michigan's pro-defendant law, to action for malicious prosecution
brought by a Michigan plaintiff against the federal government and arising out of D.C. conduct and
Michigan injury).
98. See Pittman v. Maldania, Inc., No. ooC-oI-o29 JTV, 2001 WL 1221704, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.
July 31, 2001) (applying Delaware's pro-plaintiff law, rather than Pennsylvania's pro-defendant law, to
action arising from Pennsylvania injury caused by jet skis rented at defendant's Delaware shop to
Delaware minors).
99. See Marra v. Bushee, 447 F.2d 1282, 1283-84 (2d Cir. 1971) (decided under Vermont conflicts
law; holding that if the defendant's conduct had occurred in Vermont, the New York plaintiff would
be entitled to an action for alienation of affection against the Vermont defendant under Vermont law,
even though the injury occurred in New York, which did not allow this action). But see Williams v.
Jeffs, 57 P-3d 232, 237-38 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (dismissing action for alienation of affection brought
by Arizona plaintiff against Utah defendants despite Utah's numerous contacts, including the
occurrence of the critical conduct; Utah law, but not Arizona law, allowed the action).
1oo. See Tri-State, 2007 WL 2007587, at *5-6; Pittman, 2001 WL 1221704, at *4; Marra, 447 F.2d at
1283-84.
iol. See Williams, 57 P-3d at 237-38.
102. The following cases certified a multistate class action under the pro-plaintiff law of the state
of conduct and defendant's principal place of business (noted in parentheses); the plaintiffs had
suffered their injuries in their home states, which had pro-defendant laws. See Powers v. Lycoming
Engines, 245 F.R.D. 226, 230-35 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (Pennsylvania); Rakes v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of
Am., No. o6-CV- 9 9-LRR, 2007 WL 2122195, at *9 (N.D. Iowa July 20, 2007) (Iowa); In re St. Jude
Med., Inc., No. MDL No. 01-1396 (JRT/FLN), 2oo6 WL 2943154, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2006)
(Minnesota); Dal Ponte v. Am. Mortgage Express Corp., No. 04-2152 (JEI), 2oo6 WL 2403982, at *7
(D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2oo6) (New Jersey); O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 274
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (New Jersey); In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 174-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (New
York); In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 251 (D. Del. 2002) (Delaware); Weiss
v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1297, 1298 (D.N.J. 1995) (New Jersey); Randle v.
Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 393-94 (D. Mass. 1988) (Massachusetts); Peterson v. BASF Corp., 618
N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (New Jersey); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs. Local No. 68
welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 894 A.2d 1136, 1153 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (New Jersey),
rev'd on other grounds, 929 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007); Grant Thornton LLP v. Suntrust Bank, 133 S.W-3d
342, 357-61 (Tex. App. 2004), (Texas); Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Serv., Inc., i6i P.3d 395, 402-o3
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This does not mean, however, that plaintiffs invariably succeed in
obtaining class certification under the law of the conduct state. As one
court recently noted, "certification of a nationwide class is "rare,' and
application of the law of a single state to all members of such a class is
even more rare." 0 4 In fact, many courts have denied class certification on
the ground that the claims of each class plaintiff would be governed by
the differing laws of the states in which each plaintiff was domiciled and
had suffered the injury. 05
2. Loss-Distribution Conflicts: The Inverse Conflict Paradigm
(Pattern ib)
If a conflict falling within Pattern i involves only loss-distribution
issues-such as when the state of conduct provides more generous
compensatory damages than the state of injury-then the parties'
domiciles become a relevant factor. 6 The most common Pattern i
scenario involves cases in which: (a) the defendant is domiciled in, or has
a similar affiliation with, the conduct state, which has a law that favors
the plaintiff; and (b) the plaintiff is domiciled in, or has a similar
affiliation with, the state of injury, which has a law that favors the
defendant. This study has identified sixteen loss-distribution conflicts
falling within Pattern ib. Table 4, below, depicts those cases. As the table
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (Washington).
103. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), (holding
that the Federal Securities and Exchange Act applied because the critical fraudulent conduct occurred
in the United States when two top foreign executives of defendant company resided in, and operated
the company from, the United States); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex.
2007) (certifying multinational class action under the Texas Securities Act).
104. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 A.2d 1o76,
io86 n.3 (N.J. 2007).
'05. In the following cases, the courts denied class certification after finding the law of the conduct
state (which is noted in parentheses) inapplicable. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F-3d 1oi2
(7th Cir. 2002) (Tennessee and Michigan); Lantz v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. o6 C 5932, 2oo7 WL
1424614 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2007) (California); Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 24o F.R.D. 179
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (Pennsylvania); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Ark. 2oo5)
(New Jersey and Pennsylvania); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 21o F.R.D. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo2) (New
Jersey); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 208 F.R.D. 133 (E.D. La. 2002) (New Jersey); Barbara's
Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 879 N.E.2d 9io (Ill. 2007) (California); Pratt v. Panasonic Consumer Elec.
Co., 2oo6 WL 1933660 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 12, 2o6) (New Jersey); Cartiglia v. Johnson &
Johnson Co., No. MID-L-2754-OI, 2002 WL 1009473 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 24, 2002) (New
Jersey); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2oo2) (Texas); Vanderbilt Mortgage &
Fin., Inc. v. Posey, 146 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App. 2004) (Tennessee). For cases assuming that the critical
conduct occurred in the same state as the injury, see Berry v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 497 F.
Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (New Jersey), and In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 239 F.R.D.
450 (E.D. La. 2006) (New Jersey).
io6. For example, when both parties are domiciled in the same state, then, as noted earlier, most
courts classify that as a false conflict in which only the state of the common domicile has an interest in
applying its law. See supra Part I.B.i. Likewise, when the parties are domiciled in different states that
have the same loss-distribution law, most courts adopt the same classification and apply the law of one
of the domiciliary states, by analogy to the common-domicile cases. See supra Part I.B.i, supra note 62.
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indicates, thirteen of the sixteen cases applied the pro-plaintiff law of the
state of conduct (cases i through 13), while three cases applied the pro-
defendant law of the state of injury.
TABLE 4. Loss-DISTRIBUTION CONFLICTS ARISING FROM CONDUCT IN
STATE WITH PRO-PLAINTIFF LAW AND INJURY IN STATE WITH PRO-
DEFENDANT LAW (PATTERN IB)
States' Contacts and Laws
# Case name Forum P's dom Injury Conduct D's dom
Pro-D Pro-D Pro-P Pro-P
i Schubertv. Target AR OK LA AR AR
2 Downing v. Abercrom. CA HI HI CA CA
3 Workman v. Chin. WA ID ID WA WA
4 Hitchcock v. U.S. DC VA VA DC DC I
5 Gianni v. Fort Wayne IN CT MA IN IN
6 Janssen v. Ryder NY 3rd state NJ NY NY
7 Williams v. Rawlings DC NJ DC NY NY
8 Fanning v. Dianon CO CO CO CT CT
9 Ardoyno v. Kyzar LA LA LA MS MS
Io Cates v. Creamer TX TX TX FL FL
ii Coats v. Hertz IL IL IL NY NY
12 Cortes v. Ryder IL IL IN WI WI
13 Motor Club. v. Hanifi MD NJ MD NY NY
14 Heisler v. Toyota NY NY NJ NY CA
15 Buglioli v. Enterprise NY NJ NJ NY NY
16 Salavaria v. National LA LA LA FL FL
Under the assumptions and terminology of Currie s interest
analysis, all of the cases listed above present the "no interest (or
"unprovided-for") paradigm because neither state is supposed to have an
interest in protecting the domiciliary of the other state. The state of
conduct is not supposed to be interested in applying its pro-plaintiff law
for the benefit of a plaintiff domiciled in the state of injury; conversely,
the state of injury is not supposed to have an interest in applying its pro-
defendant law for the benefit of a defendant domiciled in the state of
conduct. Currie concluded that, in the absence of conflicting interests,
the law of the forum qua forum should govern "no-interest cases
because that law is the default law and should govern in the absence of a
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good reason for its displacement. 7 Even if one agrees with Currie's
assumptions, the "no-interest" label is problematic because it prejudges
the answer to the basic question of whether a state actually has an
interest in applying its law to the particular case-a question that
reasonable minds often answer differently. For this reason, it is better to
employ the nonprescriptive term "inverse conflicts," which simply
indicates objectively that each state's law favors the party affiliated with
the other state. In any event, as explained below, virtually none of the
sixteen cases in Pattern ib have adopted Currie's assumptions about
state interests.
For example, in none of the cases did the court conclude that both
involved states were uninterested in applying their respective laws.
Rather than accepting Currie's "no-interest" label, most courts classified
the case as a false conflict.oS The courts characterized the pro-plaintiff
law of the state of conduct as partly conduct-regulating and concluded
that (i) that state had an interest in applying its law to deter defendants
from engaging in substandard conduct within its territory, and (2) the
state of injury did not have a countervailing interest in applying its pro-
defendant law. As one court put it, the application of the law of the state
of conduct would "further the interests" of that state without
"interfer[ing] with any of the articulated policies of the [state of injury],"
whereas the application of the law of the latter state would "impinge
upon [the] interests [of the state of conduct], without furthering any of
the recognizable policies of [its own]."',0 9
io7. See CURRIE, supra note 41, at 152-56.
ro8. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. United States, 665 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that interests
of state of conduct were "more substantial" than those of state of injury, at least when defendant was
headquartered in state of conduct); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Workman v. Chinchinian, 807 F. Supp. 634, 640 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (finding that application of
pro-plaintiff rule of conduct state would "clearly advance [that state's] deterrent policy," while
application of pro-defendant rule of state of injury would "not protect [that state's] residents, it
[would] merely limit the damages recoverable by its own residents"); Fanning v. Dianon Sys., Inc., No.
05-cv-o0899-LTB-CBS, 2oo6 WL 23852io, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 16, 2oo6) (finding that state of conduct
had greater interest in applying its pro-plaintiff law to deter negligent conduct there and that, since the
defendant corporation was based in that state, there was "no injustice to a corporation in applying the
law of the state where it has chosen to locate its principal place of business" (quoting Kozoway v.
Massey-Ferguson, 722 F. Supp. 641, 646 (D. Colo. 1989))); Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.
La. 1976) (finding that the state of conduct had an interest in applying its pro-plaintiff rule even
though it would benefit a foreign defendant at the expense of a local plaintiff); Schubert v. Target
Stores, Inc., 20 S.W.3 d 917, 923 (Ark. 2005) (finding that state of conduct had "a real interest in
protecting its people from negligent behavior").
io9. Williams, 357 F.2d at 586 (applying the pro-plaintiff law of the conduct state (New York)
against a New York defendant in a case arising out of injury in D.C.). In Williams, the defendant sold
his car in New York but did not follow the proper procedures for transferring title. Id at 583. The car
was later involved in a D.C. accident, injuring plaintiff, a New Jersey domiciliary. Id at 582. Under the
law of New York, but not under D.C. law, the defendant was estopped from denying his ownership,
and thus liability. Id. at 583-84-
December 2oo9] 363
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Further, as Table 4 indicates, only seven of the sixteen cases applied
forum law (cases i through 6, and case 16), while nine cases applied non-
forum law. Moreover, in the cases that applied forum law, the courts did
so on grounds other than those Currie advocated (namely, the role of
forum law as the default law). In six of the seven cases (cases i through
6), the forum state was also the state of conduct, and the courts based
their choice of law on that state's affirmative interest in policing conduct
within its borders.
Lastly, the courts did not adopt Currie's assumption that a state has
no interest in applying its law when it favors a domiciliary of another
state at the expense of its own domiciliaries. Specifically:
(i) In all thirteen cases that applied the pro-plaintiff law of the state
of conduct, that law disfavored a defendant domiciled in that state."0 In
many of those cases, the court concluded that the state of conduct had an
affirmative interest in applying its law to deter defendants from engaging
in substandard conduct within its territory;"'
(2) In eight of the thirteen cases that applied the pro-plaintiff law of
the state of conduct, the party who benefited was a plaintiff who was not
a domiciliary of the forum state;"2
i1o. See supra p. 362 tbl. 4, cases i through 13.
i ir. See supra note ro8.
112. See Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001) (action for
misappropriation of a person's picture and name for commercial purposes; applying the pro-plaintiff
law of the state of conduct (California), rather than the pro-defendant law of the state of injury
(Hawaii) in a case involving a Hawaii plaintiff and a California defendant); Motor Club of Am. Ins.
Co. v. Hanifi, 145 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 1998) (decided under Maryland conflicts law; applying New
York's car-owner liability statute to a case arising from a Maryland accident injuring a New Jersey
domiciliary and involving a car rented in New York by a New York company; Maryland law did not
impose liability); Hitchcock, 665 F.2d 354 (Federal Tort Claims Act decided under D.C. conflicts law
action for erroneous medical advice given in D.C. and causing injury in Virginia; applying the pro-
plaintiff law of the state of conduct (D.C.), rather than the pro-defendant law of the state of injury
(Virginia), in a case involving a Virginia plaintiff and D.C. defendants); Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air
Serv., Inc., 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965) (decided under Indiana conflicts law; applying Indiana's longer
limitation statute to wrongful death actions by survivors of Connecticut victims of Massachusetts air
crash, because alleged negligence in inspecting the aircraft by Indiana defendant had occurred in
Indiana); Williams, 357 F.2d 581; Workman, 807 F. Supp. 634 (action for medical malpractice resulting
from misdiagnosis in another state; applying the pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct (Washington),
rather than the pro-defendant law of the state of injury (Idaho) in a case involving an Idaho plaintiff
and a Washington defendant); Schubert, 201 S.W3d 917 (applying the pro-plaintiff law of the state of
conduct (Arkansas), rather than the pro-defendant law of the state of injury (Louisiana) in a case
involving an Oklahoma plaintiff and an Arkansas-based defendant); Janssen v. Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc., 667 N.Y.S.2d 369 (App. Div. 1998) (applying New York statute imposing liability on a car owner
in a case arising from a New Jersey accident caused by a car rented in New York and involving parties
domiciled in a state whose law was similar to New York's; New Jersey law did not impose liability); see
also Lopez v. United States, No. CV-o3-1729 (CPS), 2005 WL 2076593 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2005)
(Federal Tort Claims Act action by a New York plaintiff against the federal government decided
under Pennsylvania conflicts law; finding that critical conduct occurred in Pennsylvania and applying
its pro-plaintiff law).
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(3) In the five of the thirteen cases in which the application of the
pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct benefited a forum plaintiff,"3 the
court's reasoning for its choice-of-law decision did not match Currie's
reasoning. For example, in all five cases, the state with the pro-plaintiff
law was also the defendant's domicile. Yet, no court adopted Currie's
assumption that a state is uninterested in applying its law when it favors
foreign plaintiffs at the expense of domestic defendants. In some cases,
the court found an affirmative interest in deterring defendants from
engaging in substandard conduct within its territory;"4
(4) In six of the thirteen cases (cases i through 6), the state of
conduct was also the forum state, but the application of the pro-plaintiff
13. See Cates v. Creamer, 431 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying Florida law imposing liability on
car owner who leased the car in Florida to a Florida domiciliary, who drove to Texas and had an
accident there, injuring a Texas domiciliary; Texas law did not impose liability); Fanning v. Dianon
Sys., Inc., Civil No. o5-cv-oi899-LTB-CBS, 2oo6 WL 2385210 (D. Colo. Aug. 16, 2oo6) (applying
Connecticut's pro-plaintiff law to action for medical misdiagnosis brought against a Connecticut
medical laboratory by a Colorado patient injured in Colorado); Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78
(E.D. La. 1976) (applying Mississippi law to action for interference with contract brought by Louisiana
plaintiff against a Mississippi defendant whose conduct in Mississippi caused injury to plaintiff in both
states; Mississippi, but not Louisiana, allowed such an action.); Coats v. Hertz Corp., 695 N.E.2d 76
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (applying New York's car-owner liability statute in case arising from an Illinois
accident injuring an Illinois domiciliary and involving a car rented in New York by a company doing
business there; Illinois law did not impose liability); Cortes v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 581 N.E.2d i
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (applying Wisconsin's car-owner liability statute to case arising from an Indiana
accident injuring Illinois domiciliary and involving car rented in Wisconsin from a company doing
business there; Indiana law did not impose liability).
114. See, e.g., Fanning, 2oo6 WL 238521o, at *5 (finding that state of conduct had greater interest
in applying its pro-plaintiff law to deter negligent conduct there and that, since the defendant
corporation was based in that state, there was "no injustice to a corporation in applying the law of the
state where it has chosen to locate its principal place of business" (quoting Kozoway v. Massey-
Ferguson, 722 F. Supp. 641, 646 (D. Colo. 1989))); Ardoyno, 426 F. Supp. 78 (finding that the state of
conduct had an interest in applying its pro-plaintiff rule even though it would benefit a foreign
defendant at the expense of a local plaintiff). Several (but by no means all) products liability cases,
which are outside the scope of this Article, have also reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., McLennan
v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2001) (decided under Texas conflicts law and applying
Texas pro-plaintiff law to an action of a Canadian domiciliary injured in Canada by a product
manufactured by a Texas manufacturer in Texas); Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170 (3d Cir.
1991) (applying Pennsylvania's strict liability law to a case involving a product that was manufactured
in Pennsylvania and caused injury in British Columbia); Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913
F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas law and allowing action brought by foreign plaintiffs against
Texas manufacturer of product that was manufactured in Texas and caused injury in a state whose
statute of repose barred the action); Lewis-DeBoer v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 728 F. Supp. 642, 645
(D. Colo. 1990), (concluding that Texas, as the place of the defendant's conduct and principal place of
business, "ha[d] a greater policy interest in applying its laws and providing deterrence than Colorado
ha[d] in preventing a windfall to its citizens"; Colorado was the victim's home state and place of
injury); DeGrasse v. Sensenich Corp., No. 88-1490, 1989 WL 23775 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 1989) (applying
Pennsylvania's pro-plaintiff law to action brought by Arkansas plaintiff injured in Alabama against a
Pennsylvania manufacturer); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d io6 (N.J. 1996) (applying New Jersey's
statute of limitation and allowing action brought by family of Georgia domiciliary who was killed in
Georgia while using a product manufactured by New Jersey defendant in New Jersey; Georgia's
statute of repose barred the action).
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law of that state favored a non-forum plaintiff at the expense of a forum
defendant; and
(5) In the three cases that applied the pro-defendant law of the state
of injury, that law disfavored a forum plaintiff (cases 14 through 16) and,
in two of those cases (cases 14 and 16), it benefited a foreign defendant."5
B. PATTERN 2: CONDUCT IN STATE WITH PRO-DEFENDANT LAW AND
INJURY IN STATE WITH PRO-PLAINTIFF LAW
i. Introduction: The True Conflict Paradigm
In Pattern 2 cases, the conduct occurs in a state which, with regard
to the issue in conflict, has a law that favors the defendant, and the injury
occurs in a state that, on the same issue, has a law that favors the
plaintiff. The issue can be either:
(i) conduct regulation, such as when the state of conduct does not
consider the conduct tortious, but the state of injury considers it tortious
or imposes a more exacting or "higher" standard than the state of
conduct; or
(2) loss distribution, such as when the state of conduct (usually the
tortfeasor's home state) immunizes the defendant from suit or otherwise
disallows or limits the plaintiff's recovery, while the state of injury (often
the victim's home state) provides for more generous or unlimited
n6
recovery.
Both of the above permutations would present what is known in the
conflicts literature as the "true conflict" paradigm-situations in which
each state has an interest in applying its own law."' Under Currie's
assumptions about state interests, both the state of conduct and the state
of injury each would have an interest in applying its law to Pattern 2
conflicts. In conduct-regulation conflicts, the conduct state would have an
115. See Heisler v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 884 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying New
Jersey's nonliability rule rather than New York's car-owner liability rule in a case arising from a New
Jersey accident caused by a car rented in New York and injuring a New York domiciliary); Buglioli v.
Enterprise Rent-a-Car, 811 F. Supp. 105, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying New Jersey's non-liability
rule rather than New York's car-owner liability rule in a case arising from a New Jersey accident
caused by a car rented in New York and injuring New Jersey domiciliary), aff'd, 999 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.
1993); Salavarria v. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 705 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998) (applying
Louisiana's nonliability rule, rather than Florida's car-owner liability rule, in a case arising from a
Louisiana accident caused by car rented in Florida from Florida owner and injuring Louisiana
domiciliary).
116. It is of course possible that a state may have a pro-defendant conduct-regulating law and a
pro-plaintiff loss-distribution law, or vice versa. If so, the case will fall within Pattern 2 with regard to
conduct regulation and Pattern i with regard to loss distribution issues. The application of the law of
one state to the first and the law of the other state to the second category of issues may result in a
potentially inappropriate dcipegage, although in practice, such cases have been rare. For the criteria of
distinguishing between inappropriate and permissible dedpegage, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAws: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 206 (2d ed. 2003).
117. See supra note 76.
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interest in protecting conduct that occurs within its territory and is lawful
there, while the state of injury would have an interest in preventing
injuries within its territory caused by conduct considered unlawful there.
In loss-distribution conflicts, the first state would have an interest in
protecting conduct that is legal within its territory, while the second state
would have an interest in ensuring reparation for injuries it considers
tortious. Additionally, however, each state arguably would have an
interest in protecting the parties affiliated with it. The first state would
have an interest in protecting a tortfeasor acting (and usually domiciled)
within its territory, while the second state would have an interest in
protecting victims injured (and often domiciled or hospitalized) within its
territory.
Although both permutations fall within the true-conflict paradigm
and present similar dilemmas, the text below separates conduct-
regulation conflicts from loss-distribution conflicts because, in practice,
they tend to appear separately."
Professor Currie argued that the law of the forum qua forum should
govern all true conflicts like those of Pattern 2 because judges do not
have the constitutional authority-nor the resources-to weigh
conflicting state interests and potentially subordinate the interests of the
forum state to those of another state."' As the data in this Article
indicate, the majority of Pattern 2 cases (thirty-eight out of forty-eight
cases, or seventy-nine percent) have applied the law of the forum state.
The courts in those cases, however, did not heed Currie's proscriptions
and did not refrain from weighing state interests.
An even larger majority of Pattern 2 cases (forty-three out of forty-
eight cases, or eighty-nine percent) have applied the pro-plaintiff law of
the state of injury. The fact that Pattern 2 conflicts would likely be
characterized as true conflicts-even by those who do not subscribe to
interest analysis-indicates that reasonable minds can disagree on the
proper choice of law. On balance, the application of the pro-plaintiff law
of the state of injury is appropriate-provided that the circumstances are
such that the tortfeasor should have foreseen the occurrence of the injury
in that state and, thus, the possibility that its law might be applied. All
cases that applied the law of the state of injury have met this
requirement, which is discussed later.'20
ix8. The placement of a particular case within one category or the other is based on the court's
own assumptions, whether explicit or implicit. Even if, in a particular case, these assumptions are
questionable, they do not affect the conclusions of this Article.
i19. Currie thought that such a weighing was a "political function of a very high order ... that
should not be committed to courts in a democracy." CURRIE, supra note 41, at 182; see also id. at 278-
79, 357 (speaking of the "embarrassment of [a court] having to nullify the interests of its own
sovereign"); Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 778
(1963).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 157, 173-81, 259-63, 280. But see Weinberg, supra note i5,
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2. Conduct-Regulation Conflicts (Pattern 2a)
This study has identified thirty-one cases involving conduct-
regulating conflicts falling within Pattern 2a-namely, cases in which the
conduct did not violate the (pro-defendant) standards of the state of
conduct but did violate the (pro-plaintiff) standards of the state of injury.
Table 5, below, depicts those cases. As the table indicates, twenty-seven
of the thirty-one cases (or eighty-seven percent) applied the pro-plaintiff
law of the state of injury (see the shaded cells).
TABLE 5. CONDUCT-REGULATION CONFLICTS ARISING FROM CONDUCT
IN STATE WITH PRO-DEFENDANT LAW AND INJURY IN STATE WITH PRO-
PLAINTIFF LAW (PATTERN 2A)
States' Contacts and Laws
# Case name Forum P's Dom Injury Conduct D's Dom
Pro-P Pro-D
i Hartford Fire US US US UK UK
2 Nippon Paper US US US JPN JPN
3 Zenith Radio US US US JPN JPN
4 U.S. v. Philip Morris US US US UK UK
5 Kearney v. SSB CA CA CA GA GA
6 Butler v. Adoption M. CA CA CA AZ AZ
7 Lord v. Lord CT CT CT NY NY
8 Moore v. Green CA CA CA AZ AZ
9 Wood v. Hustler TX TX TX CA CA
io Bernhard v. Harrah's CA CA CA NV NV
ii Hoeller v. Riverside AZ AZ AZ NV NV
12 Blamey v. Brown MN MN MN 1WI WI
13 Zygmuntowicz PA PA PA NJ NJ
14 Sommers v. 133oo IN IN IN IL IL
15 Dunaway v. Fellous MO IL IL MO MO
16 Estates of Braun ID ID ID NV NV
17 Brown v. National FL FL FL GA
at 1654 (arguing that the foreseeability factor has been overstated: "[A] defendant's insurer is the
paradigmatic actuarial expert, and has every opportunity to structure the insured's coverage
accordingly. It has cvcry opportunity to adjust the defendant's premiums to take into account this and
other risks. Given the near universality of liability insurance among suable defendants, it is somewhat
unreal to speak of 'unfair surprise' to tort defendants. They have insured against liability precisely
because they anticipate it under some state's laws.").
MN
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31 Pakootas v. Teck US US US CAN CAN
The first four cases, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,12'
United States v. Nippon Paper Industries,22 Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. ,123 and United States v. Philip Morris
USA Inc.,124 involved intentional acts which, arguably, present a stronger
case for applying the stricter law of the state of injury than negligence
cases. Indeed, not many people would question the right of a state to
punish conduct that is intended to produce-and does produce-
detrimental effects within its territory, even when that conduct takes
place outside the state. As Justice Holmes stated almost a century ago,
"[a]cts done outside the jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the
cause of the harm."I 25 To this end, federal courts have developed the so-
121. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
122. Io9 F.3d i (ist Cir. 1997) (upholding criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act of a
Japanese defendant for conduct in Japan (price fixing) that was intended to, and did, produce
detrimental effects in the United States).
123. 494 F. Supp. I61 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that, even if Japanese defendant committed no
acts outside Japan, the defendant could be liable under the Sherman Act if proven to have
participated in worldwide conspiracy intended to affect the American market).
124. 566 F.3d 1095, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (employing the "effects test" and affirming district
court's holding that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) applied to a British
defendant whose conduct in the United Kingdom produced intended and substantial detrimental
effects in the United States).
125. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
States' Contacts and Laws
# Case name Forum P's Dom Injury Conduct D's Dom
Pro-P Pro-D _
18 Sierra v. Betterway FL FL FL GA GA
19 Fu v. Fi NJ NJ NY NJ NJ
20 Piche"v. Nugent ME Quebec ME NH MA
21 Eby v. Thompson DE DE DE MD MD
22 Brunow v. Burnett CT NY CT MA MA
23 Zatuchny v. Doe NY NJ NY NJ MI
24 Oyola v. Burgos RI RI NY MA MA
25 Townsend v. Boclair CT ME CT ME ME
26 Air Crash at Washington DC Many DC VA FL
27 Rice v. Nova Biomed. IL IL IL MA MA
28 Cooper v. Am. Exp. LA AL AL LA LA
29 Ashland Oil. v. Miller LA KY MS LA LA
30 Nnadili v. Chevron DC DC DC MD MD
I p I
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called "effects doctrine" for acts committed abroad that produce
intended injuries in the United States.
In Hartford Fire, one of several cases applying or reiterating this
doctrine,2' the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act applies to
"foreign conduct that was meant to produce, and did in fact produce,
some substantial effects in the United States."' 27 Hartford Fire applied
the Act to British insurance underwriters who, while in London, engaged
in conduct designed to affect the insurance market in the United States.2 8
The Court held that, because the defendants' London conduct was meant
to produce (and did, in fact, produce) substantial effects in the United
States, the Sherman Act was applicable-even though, as the defendants
claimed, their conduct was perfectly consistent with British law and
Britain had "a strong policy to permit or encourage such conduct.""' As
long as the defendants did not claim that British law required them to act
in a way that violated American law, or that their compliance with the
laws of both countries was otherwise impossible, the defendants were
perfectly capable of complying with the laws of both countries. 30 Several
lower-court cases have likewise applied the Sherman Act, along with
other federal statutes, such as the Securities and Exchange Act, to cases
involving foreign conduct that produced detrimental effects in the
United States.' 3'
The remaining twenty-seven cases in Table 5 involved negligent
conduct, for which the argument for applying the higher standard of the
126. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) ("[Ojur courts
have long held that application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct
is . . . reasonable.. . insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that
foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986) ("The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only when
the conduct has an effect on American commerce."); Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the
conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries.").
127. 509 U.S. at 795-96.
128. Id. at 796 ("[T]he conduct alleged here [is] that the London reinsurers engaged in unlawful
conspiracies to affect the market for insurance in the United States and that their conduct in fact
produced substantial effect.").
129. Id. at 799 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415 cmt. j (1987)).
130. See id.
131. See Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998); Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. &
S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding
that the Securities Exchange Act applies to foreign transactions involving stock listed on the U.S.
stock exchange and adversely affecting U.S. investors), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1945); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 49 F. Supp. i16x (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
oF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 4o2(I)(c) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to . .. conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effects within its
territory[.]").
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state of injury may be less powerful psychologically. Nevertheless,
twenty-three of the twenty-seven cases applied the law of the state of
injury. Five of those cases involved cross-border communications:
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,'32 Butler v. Adoption Media,
LLCI33 Lord v. Lord,'34 Moore v. Greene,' and Wood v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc."6 In those cases, the communication originated in a state
that did not consider the communication tortious and was received in a
state that did consider it tortious. All five cases applied the law of the
latter state.
The next seven cases (cases io through 16) were "dram-shop act"
cases in which the defendant was the operator of a tavern or other
establishment serving alcohol and the plaintiff was a person injured by
one of the defendant's intoxicated patrons. The conduct at issue-the
defendant's service of alcohol to an apparently intoxicated patron-
occurred in a state that did not impose liability on tavern owners for such
conduct, while the plaintiff's injury occurred in a state that imposed such
liability (through a dram-shop act, or a judicially created rule to the same
effect). The result of this difference is a true conflict between the laws of
the two states. Five of the seven cases applied the law of the state of
injury: Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,'37 Hoeller v. Riverside Resort Hotel,'
Blamey v. Brown,"9 Zygmuntowicz v. Hospitality Investments, Inc., 4 o and
132. 137 P-3d 914, 917 (Cal. 2oo6) (applying California law and granting injunction enjoining
Georgia defendants from recording their telephone conversations with their California clients; the
recordings were legal under Georgia law, but illegal under California law).
133. 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025-26 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that the operator of an Arizona
website who refused to post an adoption ad sent by two California same-sex partners was subject to
California's Civil Rights Act).
134. No. CVolo3 8027 9 , 2002 WL 31125621, at *i (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2002) (applying
Connecticut law to invasion of privacy action between ex-spouses arising from unauthorized recording
of telephone conversation between Connecticut and New York; recording was illegal in Connecticut,
but not in New York, where recording occurred).
135. 431 F.2d 584, 590 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying California law to action for intentional infliction of
mental distress of California domiciliary caused by letters sent to him by Arizona domiciliary from
Arizona).
136. 736 F.2d 1o84 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law to invasion of privacy action filed by Texas
plaintiff whose pictures were published without permission by a California magazine publisher); see
also Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc. v. Green, 354 F. Supp. 8oo (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying New
York law to libel action filed by New York plaintiff based on documents sent from California to New
York).
137. 546 P.2d 719, 725-26 (Cal. 1976) (applying California law imposing liability on Nevada tavern
owner who served alcohol to an apparently intoxicated patron who then drove to California and
caused an accident there, injuring a California domiciliary; Nevada law did not impose liability on the
tavern owner).
138. 820 P.2d 316, 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (applying Arizona law imposing liability on Nevada
tavern owner who served alcohol to an apparently intoxicated patron, who then drove to Arizona and
caused an accident there, injuring an Arizona domiciliary; Nevada law did not impose liability on the
tavern owner).
139. 270 N.W.2d 884, 891 (Minn. 1978) (applying Minnesota law imposing liability on a Wisconsin
liquor shop owner who sold alcohol to a Minnesota minor, who then drove to Minnesota and caused
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Sommers v. [33oo Brandon Corp."' One case, Dunaway v. Fellous42
applied the "anti-dram-shop act" of the state of injury (which was also
the forum state), which specifically relieved tavern owners from liability
and made the consumption-rather than the furnishing-of alcohol the
proximate cause of injuries inflicted by drunk patrons. With much less
justification, Estates of Braun v. Cactus Pete's, Inc. also applied the
nonliability rule of the state of injury."
The next nine cases (cases 17 through 25) involved car-owner
liability statutes -namely, rules that impose vicarious liability on car
owners, including car-rental companies, for injuries caused by drivers
who use the car with the owner's consent. If the car is leased or otherwise
entrusted to someone in a state that does not impose such liability and
the accident occurs in a state that does impose such liability, the resulting
true conflict falls within Pattern 2. Of the nine cases in this pattern, seven
applied the law of the state of injury rather than that of the state of the
rental transaction or entrustment. Those cases are: Brown v. National
Car Rental System, Inc.," Sierra v. A Betterway Rent-a-Car, Inc.,'" Fu v.
Fu 146 Picht v. Nugent,"47 Zatuchny v. Doe," Eby v. Thompson,49 and
an accident there, injuring a Minnesota domiciliary; Nevada law did not impose liability on the tavern
owner).
140. 828 F. Supp. 346, 349 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (applying Pennsylvania's dram shop act against a New
Jersey tavern owner for injury caused by one of his intoxicated patrons in Pennsylvania; noting that
"the Defendant specifically targeted the Pennsylvania market and should, therefore, have expected
and planned for possible suits under Pennsylvania law").
141. 712 F. Supp. 702, 706 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying Indiana's dram shop act against an Illinois
tavern owner for injury caused by one of his intoxicated patrons in Indiana).
142. 842 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (applying Missouri's anti-dram shop act relieving a
Missouri tavern owner from liability for injury in Illinois caused by one of her drunk patrons).
143. 702 P.2d 836, 839 (Idaho 1985) (applying Nevada law and relieving a Nevada tavern owner of
liability for injury in Idaho caused by one of its drunk patrons). The Idaho court found it significant
that the Idaho victims also worked for a Nevada employer and were traveling to their Nevada
employment at the time of the accident. The court concluded that, '"i]n light of the many contacts
between all of the parties to this suit and the State of Nevada, and the expressed public policy of that
state regarding liability of tavern keepers,. . . Nevada law should apply" because "[t]o do otherwise
would result in an extra-territorial application of Idaho law to Nevada conduct, in direct contravention
of Nevada law." Id. at 838.
144. 707 So. 2d 394, 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (applying Florida law imposing liability on car
owner who rented the car in Georgia to a driver, who caused an accident in Florida, injuring a Florida
domiciliary; Georgia law did not impose liability on the car owner).
145. 863 SO. 2d 358, 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Florida law imposing liability on car
owner, who rented the car in Georgia to a driver who caused an accident in Florida, injuring a Florida
domiciliary; Georgia law did not impose liability on the car owner).
146. 733 A.2d 1133, 1149-50 (N.J. 1999) (applying New York law imposing liability on car owner
who rented car in New Jersey to a driver that caused an accident in New York, injuring a New Jersey
plaintiff; New Jersey law did not impose liability on the car owner).
147. No. Civ. 05-82-B-K, 2005 WL 2428156, at *6 (D. Me. 2005) (applying Maine law imposing
liability on Massachusetts car-rental company that rented car in New Hampshire to a California driver
who caused accident in Maine injuring Quebec motorcyclist).
148. 825 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459-60 (App. Div. 2006) (applying New York law imposing liability on
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Brunow v. Burnett. 0 Two cases refused to apply the pro-plaintiff law of
the state of injury. The first case, Townsend v. Boclair,"' instead applied
the law of the parties' common domicile, which was also the state of the
rental transaction. In the second case, Oyola v. Burgos, the court applied
the law of the home state of the driver and the victim (Rhode Island),
which, like the state of the rental transaction (Massachusetts), did not
impose liability on the car owner.152
The next four cases in Table 5 (cases 26 through 29) involved
punitive-damages conflicts. In all four cases, the state of injury imposed
punitive damages but the state of conduct did not, thus presenting a true
conflict because (a) the state of injury has an interest in deterring and
punishing conduct and actors that cause injury within its territory, and
(b) the state of conduct has an interest in regulating (and, in this case,
shielding) conduct and actors within its borders from the heavy financial
price of punitive damages. On balance, the application of the law of the
state of injury (and the award of punitive damages under that law) is a
perfectly sensible resolution to such conflicts, provided that it meets two
conditions. First, it must meet the standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.53  Gore held that, in
assessing the amount of punitive damages, a court should consider only
the conduct that caused detrimental effects in its own territory-not the
conduct that caused such effects in other states. 4 The second condition is
the general requirement of avoiding unfair surprise. In cases of this
pattern, the application of the law of the state of injury could result in
unfair surprise to the defendant if it can be shown that one could not
Michigan car-rental company that rented car in New Jersey to a New Jersey driver who was involved
in a single car-accident in New York causing the death of his New Jersey passenger).
149. No. Civ.A. o3C-io-oloTHG, 2005 WL 1653988, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2005) (applying
Delaware law imposing liability on Maryland car-rental company that rented in Maryland a car
involved in a two-car collision in Delaware injuring Delaware domiciliaries riding in the other car).
150. No. CV93-oo62o6o, 1994 WL 149334, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 1994) (applying
Connecticut law imposing liability on Massachusetts car-rental company that rented in Massachusetts
a car involved in a two-car collision in Connecticut injuring New York driver of the other car).
151. No. 4003463, 2007 WL 126933, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2007) (applying Maine law,
which did not impose liability on a car owner who rented the car in Maine to a Maine driver, who then
drove to Connecticut and caused an accident there, injuring a Maine plaintiff; Connecticut law
imposed liability on the car owner).
152. 864 A.2d 624, 628 (R.I. 2005) (applying Rhode Island law, which was the same as
Massachusetts law and did not impose liability on a car owner who rented a car in Massachusetts to a
Rhode Island driver whose daughter, in express prohibition of a clause in the rental contract, drove
the car to New York and caused an accident there, injuring Rhode Island plaintiff; New York law
imposed liability on the car owner).
153- 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) (holding that, although Alabama may consider evidence of the
defendant's non-Alabama conduct in assessing the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,
Alabama may not punish the defendant by fixing the amount of punitive damages for non-Alabama
conduct that produced injuries outside of Alabama).
354. Id.
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have reasonably foreseen the occurrence of the injury in that state
(objective foreseeability).' All four cases allowed punitive damages
under the law of the state of injury,' and all four satisfied the above
conditions. '
3. Loss-Distribution Conflicts (Pattern 2b)
Loss-distribution conflicts falling within Pattern 2b present similar
tensions as do conduct-regulation conflicts of Pattern 2a. Those tensions
increase when, as is often the case, the defendant is domiciled in the state
of conduct and the plaintiff is domiciled in the state of injury. In such
cases, the state of conduct has the previously discussed interest in
applying its pro-defendant law to protect conduct that is lawful there, as
well as an additional interest in protecting the particular defendant and
others similarly situated. Conversely, the state of injury has an equally
strong interest in (a) applying its law to prevent injuries in its territory,
and (b) compensating its domiciliary plaintiff and his or her family, and
protecting others similarly situated.
Nevertheless, American courts generally have shown little
hesitation in resolving Pattern 2b conflicts in the same way as Pattern 2a
conflicts: by applying the pro-plaintiff law of the state of injury. Indeed,
155. Besides being an objective rather than a subjective standard, this foreseeability requirement
should be understood in a "spatial" sense and should not be confused with the foreseeability of
substantive tort law. The pertinent question in conflicts law is not whether one should have foreseen
the occurrence of the injury, but whether one should have foreseen that the injury would occur in the
particular state in which the injury did occur. For example, one who operates a factory in close
proximity to the border with another state should foresee that any harmful emissions from the factory
may cause injury in the other state because the wind may blow in that direction.
156. See Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 916, 919-20 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois
law to a defamation action filed by Illinois plaintiff against Massachusetts defendant who defamed
plaintiff by statements made in Massachusetts and then repeated in Illinois; Illinois, but not
Massachusetts, imposed punitive damages); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d
1293, 1321 (5th Cir. 1982) (imposing punitive damages on a Louisiana defendant for conduct in
Louisiana that caused injuries to a Kentucky plaintiff in Mississippi and Kentucky; Louisiana did not
allow punitive damages); Cooper v. Am. Express Co., 593 F.2d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1979) (awarding
punitive damages in an invasion of privacy action under the law of the state of injury and victim's
domicile (Alabama), even though the law of the defendant's domicile and place of conduct
(Louisiana) prohibited such damages); In re Air Crash Disaster at Wash. D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333, 337
(D.D.C. 1983) (holding that airline was liable for punitive damages in case arising from a District of
Columbia crash of an airplane; airline did not properly de-ice before takeoff from an airport located
on the Virginia side of the Virginia-D.C. border, and Virginia (unlike D.C.) prohibited punitive
damages).
157. The last two cases in Table 5 involved environmental torts, and the court in both cases applied
the pro-plaintiff law of the state of injury rather than the pro-defendant law of the state of conduct. See
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. 452 F.3d io66, 1o81-82 (9th Cir. 2oo6) (holding that the
federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act applied to a lead-
zinc smelting plant, located on the banks of the Columbia River in British Columbia, which generated
hazardous waste that was discharged into the river and carried downstream, eventually settling into a
lake in Washington); Nnadili v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying
District of Columbia law to activities at the defendant's gas station in Maryland that contaminated the
plaintiffs' lands in D.C.).
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of the seventeen loss-distribution conflicts involving Pattern 2b, all but
one case applied the law of the state of injury. Table 6 depicts those
cases.
TABLE 6. Loss-DISTRIBUTION CONFLICTS ARISING FROM CONDUCT IN
STATE WITH PRO-DEFENDANT LAW AND INJURY IN STATE WITH PRO-
PLAINTIFF LAW (PATTERN 2B)
States' Contacts and Laws
# Case name Forum P's Dom Injury Conduct D's Dom
Pro-P Pro-P Pro-D Pro-D
i Franchise TB. v. Hyatt NV NV NV CA CA
2 Ensminger v. Cin. KY KY KY OH OH
3 Kuehn v. Childrens WI WI WI CA CA
4 Lab. Corp. v. Hood MD MD MD NC NC
5 Pietrantonio v. U.S. MI MI MI WI WI
6 Raflo v. U.S. DC VA DC VA DC/VA
7 Troxel v. duPont PA PA PA DE DE
8 Carver v. Schafer MO MO MO IL IL
9 Performance Motor. NJ NJ NJ NY NY
io Bankers Trust NY/OK NY NY OK OK
II Lillyv. Fisher DE DE DE NY/MO NY
12 Monroe v. Numed NY FL FL NY NY
13 Caruolo v. AC & S NY RI RI . NY IL
14 Brown v. Harper NY NY NY PA PA
15 Drinkall v. Used Car IA IA IA NE NE
16 Bombardier v. Richfield NY VT VT NY NY
17 Condit v. Dunne NY CA CA NY NY
The first two cases in Table 6 involved
immunity,'58 while the rest of the cases involved
issues of sovereign
cross-border medical
158. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 490 (2003) (action by Nevada plaintiff against
the State of California for conduct occurring in California and causing injury in Nevada; upholding
Nevada's refusal to recognize California's sovereign immunity, noting that, as the place of injury and
plaintiffs domicile, Nevada had more than the requisite contacts to constitutionally favor its own
interests over those of the conduct state); Ensminger v. Cincinnati Bell Wireless, LLC, 434 F. Supp. 2d
464, 466 (E.D. Ky. 2oo6) (refusing to honor Ohio's sovereign immunity in action filed against an Ohio
state agency by a Kentucky domiciliary who suffered injury in Kentucky caused by the negligent
conduct of the Ohio agency).
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malpractice,'59 other professional malpractice,16 defamation,' fraud or
deceptive practices," and other cross-border torts,"' as well as more
complex disputes between joint tortfeasors. 6 4
159. See Kuehn v. Children's Hosp., L.A., i"9 F.3d 1296, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1997) (decided under
Wisconsin conflicts law; action filed by the parents of a Wisconsin child who died in Wisconsin as a
result of a California hospital's negligence in improperly shipping a package to Wisconsin containing
the child's bone marrow; applying Wisconsin law, under which the action survived the child's death,
rather than California law, under which the action did not survive); Raflo v. United States, 157 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 20oo) (applying D.C. law which (unlike Virginia law) did not limit the amount of
damages in a medical malpractice action brought by a Virginia plaintiff charging that the defendant's
misdiagnosis in Virginia caused injury in D.C.); Pietrantonio v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 458, 462
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (action by a Michigan domiciliary against a Wisconsin doctor who failed to
diagnose lung cancer from an X-ray taken in Wisconsin; the court applied Michigan law, which (unlike
Wisconsin law) did not limit the amount of damages, reasoning that Michigan had an interest in
protecting its domiciliaries and that the patient did not go to Wisconsin except by referral from his
Michigan doctor); Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Hood, 911 A.2d. 841, 849-50 (Md. 2oo6) (action by a
Maryland plaintiff against a North Carolina laboratory that misread a sample from an amniocentesis
performed on the plaintiff in Maryland and sent the erroneous report to her Maryland obstetrician;
the court applied Maryland law, which provided an action to plaintiff, rather than North Carolina law,
which did not).
16o. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Lee Keeling & Assocs., 20 F.3d 1092, 1o98 (*oth Cir. 1994) (decided
under New York conflict law; applying New York's pro-plaintiff law to a case arising from injury in
New York sustained by a New York plaintiff and caused by the conduct of an Oklahoma oil and gas
consultant in Oklahoma); David B. Lilly Co. v. Fisher, 18 F.3d 1112, 1120 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying
Delaware's pro-plaintiff law to Delaware plaintiffs action for legal malpractice committed outside
Delaware by out-of-state attorneys); Performance Motorcars of Westchester, Inc. v. KPMG Peat
Marwick, 643 A.2d. 39, 41-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (applying New Jersey's pro-plaintiff law
to an action for cross-border accounting malpractice brought by a New Jersey-based corporation and
arising out of an audit report prepared by defendant, a New York accounting firm, and sent to plaintiff
in New Jersey; under New Jersey law (but not New York law), the plaintiff could maintain an action
against the defendant).
161. See, e.g., Condit v. Dunne, 317 F. Supp. 2d 344, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying California's
pro-plaintiff law rather than New York's pro-defendant law to a California congressman's defamation
action against a journalist for statements made in television and radio talk shows broadcast from New
York to a national audience; the court found that, although New York had an interest in regulating the
conduct of journalists in New York, California also had an interest in applying its law to protect its
citizens from defamation and that was "the most significant interest").
162. See Bombardier Capital. Inc. v. Richfield Hous. Ctr., Inc., Nos. 91-CV-750, 91-CV-502, 1994
WL 18294, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1994) (applying Vermont's pro-plaintiff law to an action
brought by a Massachusetts-Vermont corporation against New York defendants for fraud in the
inducement of a contract resulting from conduct in New York and causing injury in Vermont).
163. See, e.g., Caruolo v. A C & S, Inc., 226 F-3d 46, 57-59 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying Rhode Island's
pro-plaintiff joint and several liability law in an asbestosis action against an Illinois defendant filed by
a Rhode Island plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos in New York); Drinkall v. Used Car Rentals,
Inc., 32 F-3d 329, 330-33 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying lowa's pro-plaintiff law to impose liability on a
Nebraska car rental company that rented a car in Nebraska to an unlicensed driver who caused an
accident in Iowa, injuring an Iowa domiciliary); Monroe v. Numed. Inc., 68o N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (App.
Div. 1998) (applying Florida's pro-plaintiff law to a loss-of-consortium action arising out of the death
of a Florida child whose death during surgery in Florida was attributed to a defective medical device
manufactured in New York by a New York defendant); Brown v. Harper. 647 N.Y.S.2d 245. 246-48
(App. Div. *996) (applying New York's pro-plaintiff law to impose liability on a Pennsylvania dealer
who had sold car to uninsured driver, who caused New York accident that injured a New York
domiciliary).
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The only case that did not apply the law of the state of injury was
Troxel v. A.L duPont Institute, an atypical medical malpractice case in
which the foreseeability element was somewhat tenuous because the
victim was not the treated patient, but rather the patient's friend who
stayed home in Pennsylvania.' 6' Following a referral from a Pennsylvania
doctor, the patient was treated in a Delaware hospital and returned to
Pennsylvania where, unaware that she was suffering from a contagious
disease, communicated that disease to her pregnant friend and neighbor,
the plaintiff, whose in utero child died as a result of the disease.'66 The
plaintiff sued the Delaware hospital in Pennsylvania for failure to inform
its patient of the contagious nature of her disease and the resulting risk
to others" The hospital would have been liable to the plaintiff under the
law of Pennsylvania but not under Delaware law.'68 The court recognized
Pennsylvania's interest in protecting its citizens, but concluded that this
interest was "superseded by Delaware's interest in regulating the
delivery of health care services in Delaware" and in protecting
defendants who acted in that state.'"' The court said that "the qualitative
contacts of Delaware were greater and more significant than those of
Pennsylvania,'.o and that, when acting in Delaware, the defendant was
"entitled to rely on the duties and protections provided by Delaware
law."' 7' The court also stated that any rule that would allow patients to
carry with them the protective law of their domicile when they travel to
another state for medical care "would be wholly unreasonable, for it
would require hospitals and physicians to be aware of and be bound by
the laws of all states from which patients came to them for treatment."7
164. See, e.g., Bader v. Purdom, 841 F.2d 38, 38-41 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Ontario law in an
action by a New York minor bitten by defendants' dog in Ontario; defendants brought a third-party
action against the minor's parents, claiming contribution and indemnification for their negligent
supervision of the child; such claim was permitted by Ontario law, but not by New York law);
Mascarella v. Brown, 813 F. Supp. 1015, 1018-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (third-party action by a New York
defendant against a New Jersey corporation seeking contribution and indemnification for medical
malpractice committed in New York by the New York defendant; applying New York law and
allowing contribution, which was not available under New Jersey law); Glunt v. ABC Paving Co., 668
N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. Div. 1998) (case arising out of a New York traffic accident involving an Ohio
victim, his Ohio employer, and a New York defendant; applying New York law, which allowed the
New York defendant to obtain indemnification from the Ohio defendant who would be immune from
indemnification under Ohio law).
165. 636 A.2d I179, 1184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
166. Id. at ii8o.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1181-82.
169. Id. at 1181.
170. Id. at 1182.
171I. Id. at Ix8i.
172. Id. In a subsequent decision, the court allowed the plaintiffs action to proceed against the
Pennsylvania referring doctor. See Troxel v. ALI. duPont Inst., 675 A.2d 314, 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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This discussion of state interests is a reminder that Pattern 2 cases
are veritable true conflicts, which in turn means that the two states'
interests are more or less equally strong and pertinent. One element that
can tip the scales in either direction is the actor's ability to reasonably
foresee where the act will manifest its direct consequences. In Troxel,
one could argue that the Delaware doctors should have foreseen that, by
sending an uncured and uninformed contagious patient back to her home
in Pennsylvania, the consequences of that negligence would be felt in
Pennsylvania. The fact that the Troxel court did not accept this argument
suggests that the court believed strongly that, from a systemic
perspective, medical malpractice conflicts should be resolved invariably
under the law of the place where the medical services are rendered,
regardless of any other factors. Many cases, including Bledsoe v.
Crowley, have adopted this very concept.'
However, there is a difference between cases like Bledsoe, in which
a patient chooses to receive treatment at an out-of-state hospital, and
cases like Troxel, in which the victim has no relation with the hospital. In
the latter group of cases, the court should look at each case from the
perspective of the victim-an individual who has never left her home
state and has been injured there-and ask whether she deserves to rely
on the protective law of her own state. Stated another way, foreseeability
has two sides-that of the tortfeasor and that of the victim. When, as in
Bledsoe, both sides can foresee the injury occurring in the victim's home
state, the foreseeability criterion may be less critical in resolving the
conflict. But when, as in Troxel, only the tortfeasor is in a position to
foresee this eventuality and the victim cannot foresee it, the scale tips
against the tortfeasor, not the victim."7
This was precisely the court's reasoning in Carver v. Schafer.'
Carver was a dram-shop act case, but because both involved states
imposed liability on the tavern owner, the conflict centered on the
amount of damages the plaintiff could recover.176 Illinois, the state where
the tavern was located and the defendant was domiciled, limited the
amount of damages recoverable, while Missouri, the state where the
173. 849 F.2d 639, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Edwardsville Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Marion
Labs., Inc., 8o8 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1987); Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449. 454 (S.D. Ind. 1988);
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Tetzlaff, 683 F. Supp. 223, 226 (D. Nev. 1988); Grover v. Isom, 53 P-3d 821, 823
(Idaho 2002); Harper v. Silva, 399 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Neb. 1987).
174. Peter E. Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the Choice of Law in
Contract and in Tort, in 251 RECUEIL DES COURs 269, 296 (1995) ("The expectation of compensation
is . . . reasonable and fundamental, as is the converse expectation that the liability be
foreseeable . . . .").
175. 647 S.W.zd 570, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), superseded by statute, Mo. Ray. STAT. § 537.053
(1986), as recognized in Auto Owners (Mut.) Ins. Co. v. Sugar Creek Mem'l Post No. 3976, 123 S.W.3d
183, 191 (2003).
176. Id.
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accident occurred and the victim was domiciled, provided for unlimited
recovery."' The court recognized that Missouri's interest in fully
compensating Missouri domiciliaries injured in Missouri directly clashed
with Illinois' contrary interest in limiting the financial exposure of Illinois
tavern owners."' The court resolved the conflict in favor of Missouri law
by focusing on foreseeability. Noting that the defendant's tavern was
located near a major highway only ten miles from the Missouri-Illinois
border, the court found it "unlikely that [defendant] would have been
totally unaware that many of her patrons came from Missouri."9 Thus,
the court reasoned, "the fact that an accident occurred in Missouri as a
result of the intoxicated condition of one of her patrons blunts any claim
of [defendant] that a choice of Missouri law was an unpredictable
consequence.""o Then, focusing on the plaintiffs, the court concluded:
If one examines the question of predictability from [plaintiffs']
standpoint, any choice of law other than Missouri law would be a
manifestly unfair surprise. . . . To tell [plaintiffs] that a Missouri
resident who is killed by a second Missouri resident while the former is
working within Missouri that Illinois law governs a resulting lawsuit
would doubtless be met with shock and disbelief.'
III. A LOOK AT THE FOREST
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Time now to summarize the results of the cases surveyed in Part II.
Before doing so, it is important to reiterate that these cases have been
decided by courts that have abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in favor of
several different choice-of-law approaches, such as the Restatement
(Second), significant contacts, interest analysis, Leflar's better-law
approach, and several combinations of those approaches. Despite the
multiplicity and variety of approaches, however, the cases produced
remarkably consistent results. Table 7 and Charts i through 3 summarize
the results of the 105 cases portrayed in the previous four tables.
177. Id. at 576.
178. Id. at 577.
179. Id. at 577-78.
i8o. Id. at 578.
i8i. Id.
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TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Injury Conduct Pro-P law Pro-D law
[Vol 1.337
Forum Non-Forum
law
Coduct-Regulation (41
L oss-lDistr ibutton (to6)
Total (57)
Conduct- Reulation
Loss Distribution (17)
I'ota) 4$
Grand-Total (_)
Percentge
7
10
Pattern 1
34
47
Pattern 2
27 4
46 - -
50-5 'o 49-5%1
7234]
131
47 1oo
.16
4--------
96
85.6%:
-4
I
15
144%l3
The three most revealing-and, perhaps, surprising
study of cases are:
ifndings of this
(t) The cases are almost evenly split (fifty-three to fifty-two
between applying the law of the place of conduct and the law of the place
of injury;
(2) The vast majority of the cases (90 out of 105 cases, or 86%)"
have applied whichever of the two laws favored the plaintf and
(3) Almost two thirds of the cases (68 out of 105 cases, or 65%) have
applied the law of the forum state.
i&2, Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole muniber,
380
17'24
31
25
12
I I
68
64-8%
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If the 105 cases had been decided under the traditional lex loci
delicti rule, then, barring the use of escape devices, such as
characterization, ordre public, or renvoi, which are often used in states
that follow that rule, the results would have been as follows:
(i) All (rather than half) of the 105 cases would have been decided
under the law of the state of injury;
(2) Fifty-four (rather than fourteen) percent of the cases would have
applied a law that favored the defendant-all fifty-seven cases falling
within Pattern i, and
(3) Fifty-seven (rather than sixty-five) percent of the cases would
have applied the law of the forum.
These differences are discussed below.
B. COMPARiSON WiTH IHL LEX LOCI DELICTJ RuLE AND CURRIE'S
SOLUTIONS
z. Pattern ia
A total of forty-one conduct-regulation conflicts fell within Pattern
ta, the false conflict subpattern-cases in which the conduct occurred in
a pro-plaintiff state and the injury occurred in a pro-defendant state.
Under the lex loci delicti rule, all forty-one cases would have applied
the pro-defendant law of the state of injury, which was the forum state in
fourteen cases.
Under Currie's analysis, all forty-one cases would have applied the
pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct because that state would be the
183 See sMEONIDES, Supra nOte 8, at 74-85,
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only one with an interest in having its law applied. The state of conduct
was also the forum state in twenty-four cases.
In the actual cases, the courts applied the pro-plaintiff law of the
state of conduct in thirty-four cases. That state was the forum in twenty-
four cases.
PATTERN IA CASES (CONDUCT REGULATION CONFLICTS)
Conduct Injury Forum Non-Forum Pro-P Pro-D
Lex loci delicti 0 41 14 27 0 41
Currie 41 0 24 17 41 0
The cases 34 7 24 17 34 7
2. Pattern ib
Sixteen loss-distribution conflicts fell within Pattern ib, the inverse
conflict sub-pattern in which the parties' domiciles are added to the
equation: the pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct favors a victim
domiciled in the state of injury, while the pro-defendant law of the state
of injury favors a defendant domiciled in the state of conduct.
Under the lex loci delicti rule, all sixteen cases would have been
decided under the law of the state of injury, which favored the defendant
in all cases and was the forum state in six cases.
Under Currie's assumptions, all sixteen cases would have been
classified as "no-interest" cases because neither state would have an
interest in protecting the domiciliary of the other state. All sixteen cases
would have been resolved under the lex fori in its role as the residual law.
This would have produced a pro-plaintiff result in six cases and a pro-
defendant result in ten cases.
Contrary to Currie's prescriptions, only seven of the sixteen cases
applied the law of the forum. Moreover, in most of the sixteen cases, the
court based its choice-of-law decision on the chosen state's affirmative
interests or contacts, rather than on the state's lack of interest or the role
of forum law as the residual law. Thirteen of the sixteen cases applied the
pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct, and three cases applied the pro-
defendant law of the state of injury.
PATTERN IB CASES (Loss-DISTRIBUTION CONFLICTS)
Conduct Injury Forum Non-Forum Pro-P Pro-D
Lex loci delicti 0 16 6 Io 0 16
Currie 8 8 16 o 6 I
The cases 13 3 7 9 13 3
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3. Pattern 2
Forty-eight of the 105 cases fell within Pattern 2-the true conflict
pattern-namely, cases in which the conduct occurred in a pro-defendant
state and the injury occurred in a pro-plaintiff state.
Under the lex loci rule, and barring the use of escape devices, all
forty-eight of these cases would have been resolved under the law of the
state of injury, which had a pro-plaintiff law in all cases and was the
forum state in forty cases.
Under Professor Currie's assumptions and analysis, all forty-eight
cases would have been resolved under the law of the forum state
because, in Currie's view, courts lack the ability or authority to weigh
conflicting state interests and thus potentially subordinate the interests of
the forum state to those of another state.' 4 In forty of the forty-eight
cases, the forum state was also the state of injury and had a pro-plaintiff
law."
In the actual cases, the courts applied the pro-plaintiff law of the
state of injury in forty-three of the forty-eight cases. In all forty-three
cases, the plaintiff was also domiciled in that state. This was a supporting
factor in conduct-regulation conflicts and an important factor in loss-
distribution conflicts because it provided an additional basis for that
state's interest in protecting people injured within its territory. In thirty-
seven cases, the state of the applicable law was also the forum state.
However, none of the cases in which the courts applied the forum law did
so for the reasons advanced by Currie-namely, the court's inability or
lack of authority to weigh conflicting state interests. On the contrary, in
many of these cases, the courts openly engaged in weighing the
conflicting state interests.
PATTERN 2 CASES
Conduct Injury Forum Non-Forum Pro-P Pro-D
Lex loci delicti 0 48 40 8 48 0
Currie 8 40 48 0 40 8
The cases 5 43 37 11 43 5
On the whole, courts in the actual cases applied a pro-plaintiff law
more often than if they had been decided under either Currie's analysis
or the lex loci delicti rule. Further, courts applied the law of the forum
184. See supra note I19-
185. In one case, Qyola v. Burgos, 864 A.2d 624, 626 (R.I. 2005), the forum's only contact was that
it was the domicile of the plaintiff. See supra p. 368-69 tbl. 5 (case 24) for discussion of this case.
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less often than Currie but more often than courts following the lex loci
delicti rule. Specifically, the cases have applied:
(i) the law of the place of conduct in fifty-two cases, compared to
fifty-seven under Currie's analysis and none under thc lex ldcidelicti rule
(Chart 4)
(2) a pro-plaintiff law in ninety cases, compared to the eighty-seven
cases under Currrie's analysis and forty-eight cases under the lex loci
delicti rule (Chart 5 ; and
(3) the law of the forum in sixty-eight cases, compared to eighty-
eight under Currie's analysis and sixty under the esx loci delicti rule.
C. THE CONTACi AND LAW r 01m l FORi iSTATE
The high percentage of pro-plaintiff results, coupled with the
relatively high percentage of cases applying forum law, suggests that
plaintiffs are taking full advantage of the opportunities provided by
[Vol61'337
WHY PLAINTIFFS WIN AND SHOULD
current jurisdictional rules to sue in states with favorable laws. However,
this may not occur as often as critics assume, and it does not necessarily
amount to forum shopping. Of course, this depends on one's definition of
forum shopping.' If one defines forum shopping in a way that would
include all cases in which the plaintiff sues in a state with a favorable
substantive law, then one may conclude that plaintiffs do engage in
forum shopping-inasmuch as plaintiffs sued in states with a pro-plaintiff
substantive law in seventy percent of the cases (73 of the 105).
Chart 7. Forum's Law
Pro-D
32
30%
Pro-P
73
70%
However, a more precise definition of forum shopping should
encompass only those cases in which a plaintiff unfairly exploits the
jurisdictional rules to sue in a state that does not have relevant contacts
beyond a minimum jurisdictional nexus with the defendant (e.g., doing
business).18 Under this definition, none of the 105 cases would qualify as
186. Surprisingly, there is no universally accepted definition of forum shopping. See J. Fawcett,
Products Liability in Private International Law: A European Perspective, 238 RECUEIL DES CouRs 9, 96
(1993) ("Forum shopping is not a term of art."); Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What's Wrong with
That?, 24 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 25, 26 (2005) ("[N]o court . . . has given a crystal-clear definition of the
term 'forum shopping."'). Black's Law Dictionary defines forum-shopping as "[t]he practice of
choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard." See BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed. 2004). A jurisdiction may be favorable for procedural, substantive, logistical,
or other reasons, and the motives for choosing a forum vary from case to case. According to one
commentator, "the most common motive for forum shopping is selection of the law to be applied to
the case." Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue,
78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 88 (£999); see also Emil Petrossian, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational
Forum Shopping in the United States and England, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. I257, 1264 (2007) ("[S]ome
courts approach the issue of forum shopping by focusing on the substantive law that applies in the
action.").
187. See, e.g., Algero, supra note 186, at 81 ("So what then is or should be forbidden or
discouraged under the term 'forum shopping'? Perhaps it refers only to those egregious circumstances
in which attorneys file suits in forums allowed by law, but inconvenient because of their lack of
connection to the issues involved in the lawsuits."). For additional examples, see Ferens v. John Deere
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forum-shopping cases because the forum in every case had legitimate and
pertinent jurisdictional contacts. Specifically:
(i) In almost half of the cases (52 Of IO5 cases, or 49.5%), the
plaintiffs sued in their home state, but that state was also the place of
injury in forty-six cases and the place of conduct in two cases.'1 In thirty-
six of those fifty-two cases, the forum state had a pro-plaintiff law, and
that law must have played a role in the plaintiffs' decision to sue there.
However, in the remaining sixteen cases, the forum state had a pro-
defendant law. It seems that some plaintiffs prefer the convenience, or
other advantages, of litigating in their home state, even if that state has
an unfavorable substantive law, thus pinning their hopes on the forum's
conflicts law.
(2) In 39 of the 1oS cases (37%), the plaintiffs sued in the
defendant's home state, which was also the state of conduct in thirty-
eight cases and the state of injury in one case. In thirty-one of the thirty-
nine cases, the forum had a pro-plaintiff law, and this undoubtedly
influenced the plaintiffs' decision to sue there. However, in the
remaining eight cases, the forum had a pro-defendant law. The fact that
the plaintiffs nevertheless sued there must find its explanation in other
factors. Lack of jurisdiction in other states was a factor in only two cases.
(3) In eighteen cases, the forum had only one of the four contacts
portrayed in the tables. That contact was the plaintiff's domicile in four
cases, the place of injury in thirteen cases, and the place of conduct in
one case. Only in half of the eighteen cases did the forum have a pro-
plaintiff law.
CO., 494 U.S. 5P6, 538 (1990), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
188. In four cases, the forum was the plaintiffs home state, without any of the other three contacts.
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All in all, the plaintiffs sued in a state with a pro-plaintiff substantive
law in 73 of the 105 cases (70%). This is not an excessive number and, if
anything, it is less notable than the remaining thirty-two cases in which
the plaintiffs sued in a state with a pro-defendant law. 8 9
By and large, the plaintiffs' faith in the forum's conflicts law does
not appear misplaced. For example, of the thirty-two plaintiffs who sued
in a state with a pro-defendant law, twenty-seven plaintiffs succeeded in
persuading the court to apply the pro-plaintiff law of another state.
Clearly, the seventy-three plaintiffs who sued in a state with a pro-
plaintiff law had an easier task. Sixty-three of these plaintiffs succeeded
in convincing the court to apply the forum state's own law." Percentage-
wise, the number of cases applying a pro-plaintiff law was only slightly
higher in cases decided in states that had a pro-plaintiff law than in cases
decided in states that had a pro-defendant law (eighty-six percent versus
eighty-four percent).
Chart&8. Forum's Contacts and Law
189. Of these thirty-two cases, fifteen were filed in the plaintiff's home state and place of injury,
seven in the defendant's home state and place of conduct, seven in the state of injury, and three
elsewhere.
190. See infra p. 388 chart 9.
d i i A i i
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Of the sixty-eight cases (out of 105 cases, or 65%) that applied the
law of the forum state: (a) thirty-seven cases fell within Pattern 2., the
true conflict pattern (which encompassed forty-three cases); (b) twenty-
four cases were conduct-regulation conflicts falling within Pattern .a, the
false conflict subgroup (which encompassed forty-one cases); and (c) the
remaining seven cases were loss-distribution conflicts falling within
Pattern ib, the inverse conflict group (which encompassed sixteen cases).
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D. THE CONTACTS AND LAW OF THE STATE OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
After looking at the contacts of the forum state, the next task is to
summarize (i) the contacts of the state whose law the court applied, and
(2) the content of that law.
Eight of the 105 cases applied the law of a state that had three
contacts; eighty-five cases applied the law of a state that had two
contacts; and twelve cases applied the law of a state that had only one
contact (the place of injury).
In forty-one cases, the state of the applicable law was the plaintiff's
home state and place of injury. The state had a pro-plaintiff law in thirty-
six of those cases.
In fifty-one cases, the state of the applicable law was the defendant's
home state and place of conduct. The state had a pro-plaintiff law in
forty-six cases.
In twelve cases, the state of the applicable law was the state of injury
without any other contact. It had a pro-plaintiff law in seven of those
cases.191
Chart 11. State oftLaw Applied: Contacts and Law Content
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B. WHY Do PLAINTIFFS WIN?
Although fifty percent of the cases applied the law of the state of
conduct and fifty percent applied the law of the state of injury, eighty-six
percent of the cases applied whichever of the two laws favored the
plaintiff. This finding will surely provide more ammunition to those who
191. In one case, the state of the applicable law was the plaintiffs home state and place of conduct.
See Dolan v. Sea Transfer Corp., 942 A.2d 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. DiV. 2008) (case 24, supra pp. 355-
56 tbl. 3). It had a pro-plaintiff law. Id.
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believe that American courts are "too liberal" and too eager to favor
plaintiffs.'92
Yet, before coming to such a sweeping conclusion, one should bear
in mind that, although this is a high percentage, it is confined to one
category of tort conflicts-those arising from certain (but not all) cross-
border torts. As noted earlier, this study does not cover products liability
conflicts, most of which involve cross-border torts. In products cases,
courts tend to apply the law of a state that has a certain combination of
contacts (such as the plaintiff's domicile and injury, plus the place of the
product's acquisition), regardless of whether that law favors the plaintiff
or the defendant.'93 As a result, these cases are evenly split between those
that apply a pro-plaintiff law and those that apply a pro-defendant law."'
Likewise, this study does not cover other tort conflicts in which the
conduct and the injury occurred in the same state. Again, in these
conflicts, courts tend to apply the law of a state that has a certain
combination of contacts (e.g., conduct and injury, or domicile of both
parties), regardless of whether that law favors the plaintiff or
defendant."' Thus, when one looks at tort conflicts as a whole, the
percentage of cases that apply a pro-plaintiff law is much lower than
eighty-six percent and may well be closer to fifty percent.
Nevertheless, it is fair to ask whether the eighty-six percent of cross-
border cases that applied a pro-plaintiff law have unduly favored
plaintiffs. Depending on one's viewpoint, this question can be answered
differently (at least for many cases). For what it is worth, this Author's
answer is, on the whole, negative." 6 This viewpoint is based on a
thorough study of the cases and on the following points:
(i) The cases that applied a pro-plaintiff law belong to two
categories: (a) those in which the court applied the law of the state of
injury, and (b) those in which the court applied the law of the state of
192. See, e.g., supra note 20.
193. See SYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 322-27.
194. See id. at 332-33 (showing that fifty-two percent of the cases applied a pro-plaintiff law and
forty-eight percent applied a pro-defendant law). These findings are consistent with pro-defendant
trends identified by other scholars in non-conflicts cases. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change,
37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 481-83 (1990) (describing declining plaintiff success in products liability cases
in the 1980s); Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 734 (1992) (providing additional data confirming the earlier findings
of declining plaintiff success rates, with the trends even more definite in the late 198os, and concluding
that "[t]he 198os pro-defendant movement is not the result of sharp reversals in a few jurisdictions;
rather, it is truly national").
195. See supra p. 349 tbl. i (cases i-xo) and text accompanying notes 37-41.
196. It may be worth nioting that a comprehensive review of one of this Author's books has
characterized this Author as "conservative," "traditional." and as placing too high a premium on the
notion that conflicts law should be neutral and evenhanded toward plaintiffs and defendants. See
Weinberg, supra note 15, at 1632-33, 1646, 1649, i66i, 1664
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conduct. In the cases of the first category, the courts reached the same
result as they would have reached had they followed the lex loci delicti
rule. The difference is that the courts did so after determining that the
defendants foresaw (or should have foreseen) the occurrence of the
injury in that particular case. The fact that lack of foreseeability was not
a permissible defense under the lex loci regime means that defendants
have no good basis to complain about the abandonment of that regime in
this category of cases. As for the second category of cases, foreseeability
is not an issue because, in those cases, the courts applied the law of a
state of conduct, that is, a state with which the defendants had voluntarily
associated themselves and which, more often than not, was also the
defendants' home state. Under those circumstances, the application of
that state's law could hardly surprise the defendants.
(2) In the vast majority of cases that applied a pro-plaintiff law, the
courts did so not for the sake of the individual plaintiff, but rather in
order to effectuate the policies of a state in deterring wrongful conduct,
preventing injuries, or protecting tort victims as a class. Although
plaintiffs as a class have been the beneficiaries of these choice-of-law
decisions, the individual plaintiffs were not the reason for these choices.
(3) By definition, tort conflicts involve conflicting value judgments
of at least two states as to who should bear the social and economic
losses caused by injurious conduct that at least one state considers
tortious. In the final analysis, of the two actors involved in the conflict,
the tortfeasor is the one who is in a better position to prevent the loss."
All other factors being equal, it is not unfair to place this burden on the
actor who was in a better position to prevent the loss.
Finally, whether one agrees or disagrees with the above assessment,
these are the results of the cases. Perhaps these results should be
different; perhaps not. Perhaps judges should be more sympathetic
toward actors whose conduct causes injuries in other states; perhaps not.
Such changes, even if desirable, cannot come about as a result of
academic commentary. If the results of the case law-be they good or
bad-cannot, or will not, be changed,' 8 is it possible to at least increase
the predictability of these results? Can we improve the system by making
it more efficient?
This Author's answer is a hopeful, perhaps even utopian, yes. One
vehicle for gaining efficiency is to adopt choice-of-law rules which, to the
197. The scenario in which the victim also had the ability to prevent or minimize the loss is
addressed through the rules of contributory fault.
198. It may well be that this Author attributes too much significance to what the courts do. See
Weinberg, supra note 15, at 1648 ("Symeonides acts on the principle that what courts do, and their
measure of agreement in what they do, are phenomena to be taken very seriously indeed. Symeonides
has the strong conviction that to glean truth from reality one has to handle a great deal of reality, and
to do so with utmost care.").
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extent appropriate, will: (I) codify the results of the cases; (2) avoid
repeating the mistakes created by the old rules (which were not based on
judicial experience);"' and (3) incorporate not only the best teachings of
revolutionary thought, but also the lessons of both the revolution and its
aftermath. Before offering suggestions regarding the content of these
rules, it would be helpful to discuss some existing rules for cross-border
tort conflicts. This discussion begins with three sets of American rules-
an academic rule, a judicial rule, and a legislative rule-and then turns to
foreign systems.
IV. CHOICE-OF-LAw RULES FOR CROSS-BORDER TORTS
A. AMERICAN RULES
i. Professor Cavers's Principles
In his seminal 1965 book The Choice of Law Process, Professor
David F. Cavers, one of the legendary figures of American conflicts law,
proposed five "principles of preference" for tort conflicts and two
principles for contract conflicts.7' His first principle for torts would cover
cross-border conflicts falling within Pattern i. The principle provides, in
part, that
[w]here the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard of
conduct or of financial protection against injury than do the laws of the
state where the person causing the injury has acted ... the laws of the
state of injury should determine the standard ... applicable to the
201
case ....
Thus, this principle would resolve Pattern i conflicts in the same way as
the majority of actual cases. Cavers offered the following rationale for
this result:
Th[e] system of physical and financial protection [of the state of
injury] would be impaired.. . if actions outside the state but having
foreseeable effects within it were not also subject to its law.... [T]he
fact that [the defendant] would be held to a lower standard of care or
of damages back in the state where he had his home (or in the state
where he acted) or, indeed, the fact that he enjoyed an immunity there,
199. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The First Conflicts Restatement Through the Eyes of Old: As Bad
as Its Reputation?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 39, 58-59, 72-74 (2007) (documenting how Professor Beale's
adoption of territoriality as the exclusive choice-of-law principle was not justified by the case law of
that time, and that, in drafting specific rules (such as the lex loci contractus rule), Beale ignored
contrary judicial precedents). In the ALI discussion of the Restatement in 1928, Beale candidly
admitted that the rule he proposed was "opposed to a majority of the cases." See 6 A.L.I. PROC. 454,
458 (1927-1928).
200. See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 139-80 (1965)-
201. Id. at 139. This principle is accompanied by an escape: 'at least where the person injured was
not so related to the person causing the injury that the question should be relegated to the law
governing their relationship." Id.
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all would ordinarily seem matters of little consequence to the state of
the injury. ..
If he has not entered the state but has caused harm within it by
his act outside it, then, save perhaps where the physical or legal
consequences of his action were not foreseeable, it is equally fair to
hold him to the standards of the state into which he sent whatever
harmful agent, animal, object, or message caused the injury.2 2
Cavers's third principle of preference would cover cross-border
conflicts falling within Pattern 2 and would support the result reached by
the cases discussed above. Principle 3 provides:
Where the state in which a defendant acted has established special
controls, including the sanction of civil liability, over conduct of the
kind in which the defendant was engaged when he caused a foreseeable
injury to the plaintiff in another state, the plaintiff, though having no
relationship to defendant, should be accorded the benefit of the special
standards of conduct and of financial protection in the state of the
defendant's conduct, even though the state of injury had imposed no
such controls or sanctions. 203
Cavers illustrates the application of this principle by discussing a
dram shop act case similar to the ones discussed above, as well as a case
in which the defendant engages in blasting operations in a state that
imposes strict liability for such operations, and these operations cause
injury in a state that follows a negligence rule.2 0 4 Cavers concludes that, in
both cases, it is appropriate to apply the law of the place of conduct in
order to effectuate the deterrent and regulatory purposes of that law.o
When that law is violated by substandard conduct occurring within that
state, Cavers posits, such conduct "is just as bad when the victim is an
outsider as an insider,"" regardless of whether the injury materializes
within or outside that state.f
2. The Neumeier Rules
In the 1972 case Neumeier v. Kuehner, the New York Court of
Appeals enunciated a set of choice-of-law rules to deal with the then-
202. Id. at 140, 141. Cavers also argued that the same rationale applies even if the victim is not
domiciled in the state of injury but is instead domiciled in a state that has a lower standard of financial
protection than the state of injury. See id. at 144 ("[T]he financial protection a state has prescribed,
being a part of its provision for the general security, is in part a sanction for wrongfully causing harm.
As a consequence its purposes include elements of deterrence and retribution even though it may be
couched in essentially compensatory terms. When the laws of the state of injury are viewed in this
light, the restrictive laws of the plaintiff's home state tend to fade into irrelevance.").
2o3. Id. at 159 (italics omitted).
204. Id. at 159- 6 i.
205. Id. at 16i.
206. Id. at I6o.
207. See id. at i6o-6.
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common and problematic guest-statute conflicts." In the 1985 case
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., the court expanded the scope of
these rules to encompass other loss-distribution conflicts;" however, the
court did not extend the rules to conduct-regulation conflicts, which
continue to be resolved under interest analysis.2"o The second Neumeier
rule, which is divided into Rule 2a and 2b for discussion purposes,
provides as follows:
[Rule 2a]. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his
domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct,
he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be
imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the victim's
domicile. [Rule 2b]. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the
state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who
has come into that state should not-in the absence of special
circumstances -be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a
defense."'
On its surface, this rule seems to cover cross-border torts falling
within Pattern i. The problem is that the two parts of the rule conflict
with each other. For example, when a defendant acts in his home state,
whose law protects him, and causes injury to the victim in her home
state, whose law protects her, Rule 2a calls for the application of the law
of the former state, whereas Rule 2b calls for the application of the law
of the latter state. This conflict is due to the fact that these rules have
been devised for traffic accident cases, which are intrastate by definition.
Thus, when Rule 2a speaks of the "driver's conduct," it presupposes that
any injury resulting from that conduct will also occur in the same state.
Likewise, when Rule 2b speaks of a "guest [being] injured in the state of
his own domicile," it assumes that the injury is the result of the host-
driver's conduct and that both the conduct and the injury have occurred
in the same state. By extending the scope of the Neumeier rules beyond
guest-statute conflicts, the Schultz court made the rules applicable to
cross-border torts but did not give careful thought to the old question of
"localizing" the tort. Where one places the locus of the tort determines
which of the Neumeier rules (or part thereof) is applicable and ultimately
determines the outcome of the case.
In the absence of clear guidance from New York's highest court,
lower courts continue to speak of the "locus of the tort" and, uncritically
relying on dicta contained in Schultz, place the "locus" in the state
2o8. 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (N.Y. 1972) (applying Ontario "guest-statute," which barred suits by
gratuitous guest-passengers against their host drivers, in an action brought against New York host-
driver by family of Ontario guest-passenger who was killed in Ontario accident).
209. 480 N.E.2d 679, 683-85 (N.Y. 1985).
210. See, e.g., Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519 (1994).
21!. Neumeer, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58 (quoting Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 58 (1969) (Fuld,
C.J., concurring)).
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"where the last event necessary to make the actor liable occurred,"2 2
namely, the state of injury.2 I3 This means that, in Pattern i cases, the
place of conduct becomes irrelevant. More importantly, it means that
Rule 2b trumps Rule 2a, thus resulting in the application of the pro-
recovery law of the victim's home state and place of injury. For reasons
explained above, this result is proper, except for the lack of a
foreseeability proviso. Fortunately, Rule 2b contains an escape of sorts-
"in the absence of special circumstances" -which allows courts to
consider the foreseeability factor.
Rule 2 does not apply in the converse situation, namely, cases falling
within Pattern 2, in which the conduct occurs in a state with a pro-
plaintiff law and the injury occurs in a state with a pro-defendant law.
Consequently, these cases will fall within the scope of the third Neumeier
rule, the default rule, which provides for the application of the law of the
state in which "the accident" occurred.214 Although the quoted term is
somewhat ambiguous when applied to cross-border torts, courts have
assumed that it refers to the place of injury.' Fortunately, this rule also
contains a more explicit, if vague, escape for cases in which the non-
application of the law of the place of injury "will advance the relevant
substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth workings of the
multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants."21
In summary, under the Neumeier rules, both Pattern i and Pattern 2
cases will be decided under the law of the state of injury, regardless of
whether or not that law favors the plaintiff or the defendant (unless the
opposing party persuades the court to apply the escapes).
3. The Louisiana Codification
The Louisiana codification of 1991 distinguishes between conduct-
regulation and loss-distribution conflicts and provides different rules for
212. Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 683.
213. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Lee Keeling & Assocs., 20 F.3d 1092, 1o98 (ioth Cir. 1994); Kramer
v. Showa Denko K.K., 929 F. Supp. 733, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 47 F.
Supp. 2d 330, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In cases where the defendant's tortious conduct and the
plaintiffs injury occur in different states 'the place of the wrong is considered to be the place where
the last event necessary to make the actor liable occurred."' (quoting Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 683)).
214. 286 N.E.2d at 458.
215. See cases cited supra note 213.
216. Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458. For a case applying the escape, see Stevens v. Shields, 499
N.Y.S.2d 351, 353-54 (Sup. Ct. 1986), applying Florida's pro-plaintiff vicarious liability law to a New
Yorker's action against a Florida defendant arising from a New York accident, finding that Florida
had a significant interest in applying its law to its domiciliaries, and that this would not impair New
York's interest in protecting its residents from liability because a New York defendant was not
involved in the case. For a case refusing to apply the escape, see Buglioli v. Enterprise Rent-a-Car, 8ix
F. Supp. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 999 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1993), applying New Jersey's pro-defendant
common-law rule to a New Jersey plaintiffs action against a New York car-rental company that rented
the car to a New Jersey driver who caused the New Jersey accident; a New York statute imposed
liability on the car-rental company.
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each category.' The codification further subdivides the first category
into generic conduct-regulation conflicts and those involving punitive
damages. For conduct-regulation conflicts, the codification provides a
rule which, like the vast majority of cases discussed above, calls for the
application of the law of either the state of conduct or the state of injury,
whichever provides for a higher standard of conduct. Article 3543
provides as follows:
Issues pertaining to standards of conduct and safety are governed by
the law of the state in which the conduct that caused the injury
occurred, if the injury occurred in that state or in another state whose
law did not provide for a higher standard of conduct.
In all other cases, those issues are governed by the law of the state in
which the injury occurred, provided that the person whose conduct
caused the injury should have foreseen its occurrence in that state.J
For punitive damages, the codification provides a more conservative
rule, which is built around three contacts-conduct, injury, and the
tortfeasor's domicile. The rule provides that punitive damages may be
awarded when any two of these contacts are located in a state or states
that impose punitive damages for the particular conduct.' 9 In 1994, the
American Law Institute adopted the same solution for its Complex
Litigation Project.220
217. Act of i99i, No. 923, § I (adding Book IV to the Louisiana Civil Code). For discussion of the
tort provisions of this codification by its drafter, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of
Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REv. 677 (1992) [hereinafter Symeonides,
Exegesis], and Symeon C. Symeonides, La nuova normativa della Louisiana sul diritto internazionale
privato in tema di responsabilitd extracontrattuale, 29 RIV. DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E
PROCESSUALE 43 (1993).
218. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3543 (2008). A third paragraph contains a unilateral exception to the
effect that Louisiana-affiliated tortfeasors acting in Louisiana and causing injury in another state will
not be subject to the law of the latter state. Id. This exception, which was not part of the draft
submitted by this Author, was added during the legislative process. For a justified critique, see Russell
J. Weintraub, The Contributions of Symeonides and Kozyris to Making Choice of Law Predictable and
Just: An Appreciation and Critique, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 511. 515-16 (1990). The reasons for this
politically-motivated exception are explained in Symeonides, Exegesis, supra note 217, at 713-14. The
Puerto Rico Draft Code of Private International Law, which was drafted by this Author in 1991,
contains a provision that is substantively identical to the part of the Louisiana article quoted in the
text, but without the unilateral exception in favor of forum law. See Proposed Puerto Rico Civil Code,
bk. VII, art. 40, available at http://www.codigocivilpr.net/. The Draft Code is currently before the
Puerto Rico legislature as part of a broader project to revise the Puerto Rico Civil Code. See Marta
Figueroa-Torres, Recodification of Civil Law in Puerto Rico: A Quixotic Pursuit of the Civil Code for
the New Millennium, ELECTRONIc J. COMP. L., May 2008, http://www.ejcl.org/is21/art121-2I.pdf.
219. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3546. For a discussion of the rationale of this article by its drafter, see
Symeonides, Exegesis, supra note 217, at 735-49. The Puerto Rico Draft Code does not contain a
separate article for punitive damages. This means that punitive damages conflicts are governed by
Article 40 of the Draft Code, which applies to other conduct-regulating conflicts and which allows
punitive damages more easily, i.e., whenever they are allowed under the law of either the state of
conduct or the state of injury (in the latter case, subject to a foreseeability defense).
220. See AM. L. INsT., COMPLEX LIoI.: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIs § 6.o6 (1994).
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For loss-distribution conflicts arising from cross-border torts, the
Louisiana codification also takes a cautious position by dealing only with
conflicts that would fall within Pattern i but not Pattern 2. Article
3544(2)(b) of the codification provides that, when the parties are
domiciled in different states with different laws, and the conduct and
injury occur in different states, the law of the state of injury governs,
provided that (i) the injured person was domiciled in that state, (ii) the
person who caused the injury should have foreseen its occurrence in
that state, and (iii) the law of that state provided for a higher standard
of financial protection for the injured person than did the law of the
state in which the injurious conduct occurred."'
Clause (i) in the quoted text makes this rule narrower than some of
the cases discussed above because it limits the rule to those of Pattern i
cases in which the victim is domiciled in the state of injury. Clause (iii)
makes the rule inapplicable in the converse situation, namely, Pattern 2
cases in which the victim is injured (and domiciled) in a state that has a
pro-defendant law. These cases are relegated to the codification's default
rule, Article 3542, which provides for a flexible approach aiming to apply
"the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if
its law were not applied to [the particulari issue."222
4. Oregon's New Codification
Finally, the last word on this subject in the United States is Oregon's
new choice-of-law statute for torts, which was drafted by this Author.223
Section 8(3)(c) of the new statute provides in pertinent part that, in
cross-border torts (other than products liability), the law of the state of
conduct governs. 224 However, this provision also allows the application of
the law of the state of injury, if:
(A) The activities of the person whose conduct caused the injury
were such as to make foreseeable the occurrence of injury in that state;
and
(B) The injured person formally requests the application of that
state's law by a pleading or amended pleading. The request shall be
deemed to encompass all claims and issues against that defendant."
Section 8(4) provides an escape from the above provision if a party
demonstrates that the application to a disputed issue of the law of
another state is "substantially more appropriate under the principles of
221. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544(2)(b).
222. Id. art. 3542.
223. See Act effective Jan. 1, 2010, ch. 451, 2009 Or. Laws. For a comprehensive discussion of the
new law by its drafter, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Oregon's New Choice-of-Law Codification for Tort
Conflicts: An Exegesis, 88 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2oo).
224. See Act effective Jan. i, 2010, ch. 451, § 8(3)(c), 2009 Or. Laws ("If the injurious conduct
occurred in one state and the resulting injury in another state, the law of the state of conduct governs.
However, the law of the state of injury governs if. .. )
225. Id.
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section 9" (which articulates the new law's general and residual choice-
of-law approach), in which case the law of the other state applies to that
*226issue.2
Section 8(3)(c) is in line with the results reached by the majority of
cases discussed in this Article. In Pattern i cases (in which the state of
conduct has a pro-plaintiff law), the plaintiff will not invoke the above
quoted exception in favor of the state of injury. Consequently, the court
will apply the law of the state of conduct (as did the majority of cases),
unless the defendant successfully invokes the general escape of section
8(4) in favor of the law of another state. In Pattern 2 cases (in which the
state of injury has a pro-plaintiff law), the plaintiff will invoke the
exception in favor of the law of the state of injury and, if the plaintiff
satisfies the foreseeability requirement, the court will apply the law of
that state (as did the majority of cases), unless the defendant successfully
invokes the general escape of section 8(4) in favor of the law of another
state.
B. A LOOK ABROAD: FOREIGN SOLUTIONS TO CROSS-BORDER TORT
CONFLICTS
In contrast to the traditional American system, other private
international law (PIL) systems recognized early on the inherent
difficulties of cross-border tort conflicts and, for this reason, they have
been far less categorical in choosing between the places of conduct and
injury. Although these systems follow the lex loci delicti rule, they differ
from the American system (and among themselves) in localizing the
delict. For example, the Austrian'27 and Polish228 PIL codifications opt for
the place of conduct, the Dutch codification opts for the place of injury,2
and the Czech,230 Greek,"' and Spanish23 2 codifications leave the choice
between the two places unanswered, while the Japanese," Swiss,'2 and
226. Id. § 8(4).
227. See Federal Law of 15 June 1978 on Private International Law, art. 48(1), translated in Edith
Palmer, The Austrian Codification of Conflicts Law, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 222, 234 (980) [hereinafter
Austrian PIL Act].
228. See Act of 12 Nov. 1965 on Private International Law, art. 33(I) [hereinafter Polish PIL Act].
229. See Act of ii Apr. 200, Stb. 200, i, art. 3(2), translated in Paul Vlas. Dutch Private
International Law: The 2oo Act Regarding Conflict of Laws on Torts, 5o NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv.
221, 223 (2003) [hereinafter Dutch PIL Act].
230. See Act of 4 Dec. 1963, No. 97, art. 15 (law of former Czechoslovakia, now in force in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia).
231. See Astikos Kodikos [A.K.] [Civil Code] 2:26 (Greece).
232. See Preliminary Title of the Civil Code as amended on 9 July 1974, C6digo Civil [C.C.] art. 9.
(Spain).
233. See Law No. 10 of 1898, as amended on 2!I June 2006 (Act on the General Rules of
Application of Laws), translated in Ken Anderson, Translation of Japan ~s Private International Law:
Act on the General Rules of Application of Laws, 8 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 427 (2006); see also C.C. art.
57 (applying law of state of injury, unless occurrence there was unforeseeable, in which case the law of
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Quebec' codifications opt for the law of the place of conduct in some
specified cases and the law of the place of injury in other cases.
In recent years, an intriguing solution has been gaining ground:
allowing the tort victim to choose between the laws of the two places, or
authorizing the court to choose the law most favorable to the victim. As
early as 1966, the Portuguese codification gave this choice to the court.
Article 45 subjected torts to the law of the place of conduct, but also
provided that "[i]f the law of the state of injury holds the actor liable but
the law of the state where he acts does not, the law of the former state
shall apply, provided the actor could foresee the occurrence of damage in
that country as a consequence of his act or omission."236
The German codification gave this choice directly to the tort victim.
Article 40(I) of the codification provides in part: "Claims arising from tort
are governed by the law of the state in which the person liable to provide
compensation acted. The injured person may demand, however, that the
law of the state where the result took effect be applied instead."2 37
Likewise, Article 62 of the Italian codification provides in reverse that
torts are governed by the law of the state of injury, but "the person
suffering damage may request the application of the law of the State in
which the event causing the damage took place."23 Several other countries
have adopted this same principle, either for all cross-border torts or for only
state of conduct governs).
234. See Federal Law of 18 Dec. 1987, art. 133(2), translated in Jean-Claude Cornu, St6phane
Hankins & Symeon Symeonides, Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law of December I8,
1987, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 193, 228 (1989) [hereinafter Swiss PIL Act] (applying law of place of conduct,
but if injury occurred in another state, applying that state's law if the tortfeasor should have foreseen
the occurrence of the injury in that state). But see id. arts. 135, 138-39 (giving plaintiffs a choice in
certain cases).
235. See Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q., ch. 64, art. 3126 (as revised in 1991) (applying law of state of
conduct, unless the injury occurred in another state and the actor should have foreseen its occurrence
there). But see id. art. 3129 (requiring the application of Quebec law for injuries sustained outside
Quebec as a result of exposure to raw materials originating in Quebec); id. art. 3128 (giving victim a
choice in products liability cases).
236. C6DIGO CIVIL PORTUGuts as amended in 1966, art. 45(2) [hereinafter Portuguese Civ. Code].
This provision is subject to an exception for some cases in which the parties have the same nationality
or habitual residence. An identical provision is contained in Article 2097 of the Peruvian Civil Code of
1984, translated in Alejandro M. Garro, Introductory Note on the Codification of Conflicts Law in the
New Peruvian Civil Code of 1984, 24 INT'L MATEuALs LEGIS. & PERSP. 997, 1011(1985).
237. Einftihrungsgesetz zum Btirgerlichen Gesetzbuche [Introductory Act to the Civil Code], May 21,
1999, BGBI.I at 1026, art. 40(I) (F.R.G.), amended by Federal Act of 1999 for the Revision of Private
International Law, translated in Peter Hay, From Rule-Orientation to "Approach" in German Conflicts
Law: The Effect of s986 and 1999 Codifications, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 633, 65o (1999) [hereinafter EGBGB].
This principle, known as Gunstigkeitsprinzip, is traceable to an 1888 decision of the German Reichsgericht.
See decision of 20 Nov. i888, 23 ENTSCHEIDUNG EN DEs REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RG Z] 305.
238. Law No. 218 of 31 May 1995, Gazz. Uff., Supp. Ord. No. 128, June 3, 1995, translated in Andrea
Giardina, Italy: Law Reforming the Italian System of Private International Law, 35 INT'L MATERIALS LEGIS. &
PERSP. 760, 779 (1996) [herein after Italian PIL Act].
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certain categories. The first group includes countries as diverse as China, 39
Estonia,24 o Hungary,2 4' Korea,242 Lithuania,243 Serbia,2" Slovenia,2 45 Tunisia,"
and Venezuela.247
Other countries have adopted this idea only for certain torts. For
example, Belgium allows such a choice only in cases involving defamation
and in direct actions against insurers;"' Turkey adds products liability;249 the
239. In a judgment rendered on January 28, 1988, China's highest court held that a court may apply
either the law of the state of conduct or the state of injury. See Xu Donggen, Chronique de jurisprudence
chinoise, J. DR. INT'L 191 (1994). A Model Law of PIL drafted by the Chinese Society of PIL provides in
Article I12 that the victim has the right to choose between the laws of the places of conduct or injury. See
Han Depie, Model Law of Private International Law of the People's Republic of China, 3 Y.B. PRIVATE
INT'L LAW 349, 376 (2001). Article 125 allows the victim of defamation to choose from among the laws of
the victim's domicile, habitual residence, or injury, or the place of dissemination of the defamatory material
or the place of the injury. Id. at 379.
240. See Law of 28 June 1994, § 164(3), translated in Law on the General Principles of the Civil Code,
PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-UND VERFAHRENSRECHTs (IPRAx) 439-42 (1996) (Estonia).
241. See Hungarian Decree No. 13 of 1979, 33 MK, art.33(I), translated in Francis A. Gabor, A Socialist
Approach to Codification of Private International Law in Hungary: Comments and Translation, 55 TUL. L.
REv. 63 (1980) [hereinafter Hungarian PIL Act] (providing for the application of the law of the state of
conduct, unless the law of the state of injury is "preferable" to the victim).
242. See Kwang Hyun Suk, The New Conflict of Laws Act of the Republic of Korea, 5 Y.B. PRuVATE
INT'L L. 99, 127 n.45 (2oo3) (describing supreme court cases allowing choice of law most favorable to
victim).
243. See Article I.43(I) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania (2ooo) [hereinafter
Lithuanian Civil Code], available at http://www3.lrs.t/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_1?pjd=245495.
244. See Law of 15 July 1982 Concerning Conflicts with Foreign Laws, art. 28(I) (in force in the former
Yugoslavia); see also Act No. 402 of 30 Mar. 1978, art. 1102(4) (Serb.) (applicable to internal inter-republic
conflicts and providing that damages for torts are governed by "that law which is most favourable for the
injured party").
245. See Private International Law and Procedure Act 56/99 (13.o7.1999), art. 30(I) (Slovn.).
246. See Code of Private International Law, No. 98-97 of 27 Nov. 1998, art. 70 (Tunis). For a French
translation, see 88 REV. CRITIQUE DR. INT'L PIuvt 382 (1999) [hereinafter Tunisian PIL Code], providing for
the application of the law of the state of conduct, unless the victim requests the application of the law of the
state of injury.
247. See Act No. 36.511 of 6 Aug. 1998 on Private International Law, eff. 6 February 1999, art. 32,
translated in Venezuelan Act on Private International Law I Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 341 (3999) [hereinafter
Venezuelan PIL Act] (providing for the application of the law of the state of injury, unless the victim
requests the application of the law of the state of conduct). The idea of allowing the tort victim to choose
between the laws of the place of conduct or the place of injury has also been adopted in draft legislation
pending in Mexico (2oo6 Draft) and Uruguay (2oo7). See Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre & Diego Fernandez
Arroyo, A Quick Latin American Look at the Rome II Regulation, 9 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 193, 197-98
(2007).
248. See CODE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRvt (Loi du 16 juillet 2oo4), Moniteur Belge, July 27, 2004,
art. 99§2(I) [hereinafter Belgian PIL Code] (applicable to defamation; allowing plaintiff to choose between
the laws of the state of conduct and, subject to a foreseeability proviso, the state of injury); see also id. art.
xo6 (applicable to direct actions against the tortfeasor's insurer; providing that the action will be allowed if
it is allowed by either the law governing the tort or the law governing the insurance contract).
249. See CODE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CIVIL PROCEDURE (Law No. 5718 of 27 Nov. 27,
2007), art. 35, translated in The 2oo7 Turkish Code on Private International Law and International Civil
Procedure, 9 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 583, 594-95 (20o7) [hereinafter Turkish PIL Code] (applicable to
defamation; allowing plaintiff to choose between the laws of the defendant's habitual residence or place of
business and, subject to a foreseeability proviso, the states of the victim's domicile or injury); id. art. 34(4)
(applicable to direct actions against the tortfeasor's insurer; providing that the action will be allowed if it is
[Vol. 61:3374oo0
WHY PLAINTIFFS WIN AND SHOULD
Rome II Regulation does so only in environmental torts, direct actions
against insurers, and certain cases involving anticompetitive restrictions;50
Switzerland does so in cases involving emissions, injury to rights of
personality, and products liability;25' and Romania does likewise in cases of
defamation, unfair competition, and products liability. 2-2
In products liability conflicts, the Italian, Quebec, Swiss, and Turkish
codifications allow the plaintiff to choose from among the laws of either (a)
the tortfeasor's place of business or habitual residence; or (b) subject to a
proviso, the place in which the product was acquired.' The Russian Civil
Code adds the plaintiff's domicile to these choices.254 The Tunisian
codification adds the state of injury to the plaintiff's choices."' The
Romanian codification allows plaintiffs to choose between their home state
and the place of the product's acquisition,'6 while the Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Products Liability allows plaintiffs to choose
between the laws of the tortfeasor's principal place of business and the law
of the place of injury, provided that certain contingencies are met. 257 Similar
rules have been proposed in the United States.
allowed by either the law governing the tort or the law governing the insurance contract); id art- 36
(applicable to products liability; allowing plaintiff to choose between the laws of the defendant's habitual
residence or place of business and the law of the state of the product's acquisition).
250. See Regulation 864/2oo7, On the Law Applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), 2007
O.J. (L 199) 40, art. 7 (EC) [hereinafter Rome II] (environmental torts; applying the law of the state of
injury, unless the plaintiff opts for the law of the place of conduct); id art. 6(3)(b) (allowing the plaintiff to
choose between the otherwise applicable law and the law of the forum in certain cases involving
anticompetitive restrictions); id. art. 18 (authorizing a direct action against the insurer if such action is
allowed by either the law applicable to the tort or the law applicable to the insurance contract).
251. See Swiss PIL Act, supra note 234, art. 138 (applicable to emissions; allowing victim to choose
between the laws of the state of conduct and the state of injury); id. art. 139 (injury to rights of personality;
giving victims a choice from among the laws of the tortfeasor's habitual residence or place of business,
and-subject to a foreseeability defense-the victim's habitual residence or the place of the injury); id. art.
135 (allowing victims to choose between the laws of the state of the defendant's principal place of business
and, subject to a defense, the state of the product's acquisition).
252. See Law No. 1o5 of 22 Sept. 1992 on the Settlement of Private International Law Relations, eff. 26
Oct. 1993, art. 112 [hereinafter Romanian PIL Act] (applicable to defamation; allowing victim to choose
between the laws of the defendant's domicile or residence, and-subject to a foreseeability proviso-the
plaintiff's domicile or residence, or the state of injury); id. arts. i17-118 (applicable to unfair competition;
applying the law of the state of injury but also allowing the victim to choose another law in certain cases);
id. art. 114 (applicable to products liability; allowing plaintiff to choose between the laws of plaintiffs
domicile and the place of the product's acquisition).
253. See Italian PIL Act, supra note 238, art. 63; Quebec Civ. Code, supra note 235, art. 3128; Swiss PIL
Act, supra note 234, art. 135(); Turkish PIL Code, supra note 249, art. 36.
254. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 1221 (Russ.), translated in 4 Y.B. PRivATE
INT'L L. 349,363 (2002) [hereinafter Russian Civ. Code].
255. See Tunisian PIL Code, supra note 246, art. 72.
256. See Romanian PIL Act, supra note 252, art. 114.
257. See Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, arts. 4-6 (17i), available at
http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act-conventions.status&cid= 84
258. See David F. Cavers, The Proper Law of Producer's Liability, 26 Ir'r'L & COMPn. L.Q. 703, 728-29
('2977) (letting the plaintiff choose from among the laws of: (a) the place of manufacture; (b) the place of
the plaintiff's habitual residence if that place coincides with either the place of injury or the place of the
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Some of the above codifications condition the application of the law of
the state of injury to an express foreseeability proviso. One example is the
Portuguese Civil Code provision quoted earlier.259 However, some
codifications fail to include an express foreseeability proviso. For example,
the German, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Tunisian codifications provide for
the application of the law of the state of conduct, but allow the application
of the law of the state of injury at the victim's request-without
conditioning such application on foreseeability.' The German codification
adds an escape clause which may enable courts to avoid unfair results.261
The Italian and Venezuelan codifications and the Rome II regulation do
the reverse by applying the law of the injury state unless the victim requests
the application of the law of the state of conduct.,6 ' Finally, less problematic
are the provisions of the Dutch, Quebec, Russian, and Swiss codifications,
which include a foreseeability proviso but do not condition the application
of the law of the state of injury on whether that law is favorable to the
,6,
victim or the tortfeasor." Clearly, the foreseeability proviso is needed only
when that law is unfavorable to the tortfeasor.
Continental lawyers usually defend these rules on the basis of the
principle of favor laesij' that is, the principle of favoring the injured party.
In turn, this principle is at times perceived as a "cousin of the better law
approach,",6  a peculiarly American approach advocated by Professor
Robert Leflar.266 This does not mean, however, that these rules have been
influenced by Leflar or by any other American approach. Nor is there any
reason to assume that, in deciding these cases one by one, American courts
have been aware of, much less influenced by, the foreign rules discussed
above. Nevertheless, the very fact that these courts independently have
product's acquisition; or (c) the place of acquisition, if that place is also the place of injury); Russell J.
Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL L. REV.
129, 148 (giving both the victim and the tortfeasor a choice under certain circumstances); Symeon C.
Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (and a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.
REv. 437, 450-51, 472-74 (2ooo) (same notion but different choices).
259. See Portuguese Civ. Code, supra note 236, art. 45(2).
26o. See EGBGB, supra note 237, arts. 4o(I), 44; Hungarian PIL Act, supra note 241, §§32-33;
Lithuanian Civil Code, supra note 243, art. 1.43(I); Tunisian PIL Code, supra note 246, art. 70(2).
261. See EGBGB, supra note 237, art. 41.
262. See Italian PIL Act, supra note 238, art. 62.1; Venezuelan PIL Act, supra note 247, art. 32(2);
Rome II, supra note 250, art. 7 (applicable to environmental torts only).
263. See Dutch PIL Act, supra note 228, art. 3(2); Quebec Civ. Code, supra note 235, art. 3126(1);
Russian Civ. Code, supra note 254, art. 1219(i); Swiss PIL Act, supra note 234, arts. 133(2), 135, 137, 139.
142(2).
264. For a discussion of this principle in comparative conflicts law, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS?, 56-59 (2ooo), Nygh, supra
note 174, at 292-93, and Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, 232 RECUEIL DES
COURs 9, 119 (1992).
265. Jan von Hein, Something Old and Something Borrowed, but Nothing New? Rome II and the
European Choice-of-Law Evolution, 82 Tut. L. Rev. 1663. 1682 (2008).
266. See supra note 42.
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arrived at the same solutions as so many elected representatives and
legislative technocrats around the globe suggests that these solutions may
not be as "off the wall" as some critics would argue.
V. PROPOSALS IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Most of the foreign rules described above (at least those that allow
victims to choose the law governing cross-border torts, or that authorize the
court to choose the law most favorable to victims) would produce the same
result as the eighty-six percent of the American cases in which courts
applied a pro-plaintiff law. The difference is that each American court
confronting such a case must engage in a multifaceted and laborious choice-
of-law analysis and comparison of many relevant factors and policies, all
without much certainty regarding the final outcome. In contrast, the foreign
courts can arrive at the legislatively and democratically prescribed outcome
without any choice-of-law analysis, precisely because the choice has already
been made in advance by the legislature.
Can the American revolution produce similar rules for American
courts? As the Louisiana codification indicates, the answer is clearly
affirmative. The civil law heritage of that state may explain why codification
was a viable option there, but it does not mean that the resulting product is
peculiarly civilian. The codification has used civilian drafting technique and
has drawn elements from many European approaches, but, more than
anything, it has drawn from the general American conflicts experience.267
Moreover, the codification experiment has been repeated in Oregon, a
typical common-law state."' Thus, the answer to the question of "rules
versus no rules" depends on willingness rather than ability.
The reason for the American unwillingness to opt for rules is the
tumultuous experience courts endured with Beale's ill-conceived rules269
and Currie's excessive aphorism that "[w]e would be better off without
choice-of-law rules."2 70 Now it is time to ask whether this assertion remains
267. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Conflicts Book of the Louisiana Civil Code: Civilian, American,
or Original?, 83 TuL. L. REV. Io4i, 1o54-58 (2oo9); Symeon C. Symeonides, Private International Law
Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Louisiana Experience, 57 RABELS ZETSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES
UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 460 (1993).
268. See supra Part IV.A.4. See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Oregon's Conflicts Law Applicable to
Contracts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397 (2oo2); Symeon C. Symeonides, Oregon's Choice-of-Law
Codification for Contract Conflicts: An Exegesis, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 205 (2007); Symeonides, supra
note 223.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38, 199.
270. CURRIE, supra note 41, at 183; see also id. at 180 ("The rules [of the traditional theory] have
not worked and cannot be made to work. .. . But the root of the trouble goes deeper. In attempting to
use the rules we encounter difficulties that stem not from the fact that the particular rules are
bad, . . . but rather from the fact that we have such rules at all.").
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true (assuming it ever was true). For almost half a century now, we have
been without choice-of-law rules. During this period, American courts have
struggled with the various approaches generated by the revolution. After a
few false starts, and despite using different choice-of-law approaches or
merging approaches that their proponents consider incompatible, the
courts have reached remarkably consistent results in several categories of
tort conflicts. This Article has demonstrated this consistency in what is
perhaps the most difficult category of tort conflicts: cross-border torts. This
is a good time to capture and solidify this consistency. This Author has
previously argued that it is possible to compress this experience into a new
breed of smart, evolutionary choice-of-law rules that will restore a proper
equilibrium between certainty and flexibility, as well as preserve the
substantive and methodological accomplishments of the revolution."' This
Author has also proposed such rules for other categories of tort conflicts."
Is such a rule possible for cross-border torts? This Author contends that it
is. Below are some options.
B. THREE PROPOSALS
r. Option One
One option is to take the cautious approach of the Louisiana
codification. As noted earlier, this codification provides three rules for
three categories of cases, namely: (i) a conservative rule for punitive-
damages conflicts, which requires the concurrence of two contacts before
allowing punitive damages; (2) a liberal rule for other conduct-regulating
conflicts, which, like the majority of the above cases, applies the law of
either the state of conduct or the state of injury, whichever prescribes a
higher standard of conduct; and (3) an elliptical rule covering only certain
loss-distribution conflicts in which the victim is injured and domiciled in a
state whose law favors the victim more than the state of conduct.?" A
variation of this option is provided by the Puerto Rico Draft Code, which
271. See sYMEONIDES, CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 424-37.
272. Id. at 207-08, 235, 259-61, 346 (proposing specific rules for intrastate tort conflicts and product
liability conflicts). For a review of rules proposed by other scholars for product liability conflicts, see
SCOLEs, HAY, BORCHERS, & SYMEONIDEs, supra note 9, at 937-41, reviewing rules proposed by Cavers,
Juenger, Kozyris, and Weintraub, and see also Robert A. Sedler, Choice of Law in Conflicts Torts
Cases: A Third Restatement or Rules of Choice of Law?, 75 IND. L.J. 615 (2ooo), Robert A. Sedler,
Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44
TENN. L. REV. 975 (1977), and Bruce Posnak, The Restatement (Second): Some Not So Fine Tuning for
a Restatement (Third): A Very Well-Curried Leflar over Reese with Korn on the Side (Or Is It Cob?), 75
IND). L.J. 56i (2000).
273. See supra notes 217 22 and accompanying text. The above rules are inapplicable to most
products-liability conflicts, for which the Louisiana codification provides a separate rule. See LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 3545 (2oo8). All of these rules are subject to an escape clause. See id. art. 3547.
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subjects punitive-damage conflicts to the same rule as other conduct-
regulating conflicts.274
The Louisiana option will produce fewer pro-plaintiff results than the
American cases in two categories: punitive-damage conflicts and loss-
distribution conflicts.' Having drafted that codification, this Author does
not feel the need to apologize for it." 6 Suffice it to say that the codification
is in line with the conservative leanings of that state, where, for example,
the law prohibits punitive damages for most torts."
2. Option Two
A middle-of-the-road option would be to adopt a single rule for all
three of the above categories of conflicts, which would provide as follows:
When the tortfeasor and the victim are domiciled in different states,
the law of the state of conduct governs all claims against the tortfeasor.
However, if the injury occurs in another state whose law prescribes a
higher standard of conduct for the tortfeasor or provides for a higher
standard of financial protection for the victim, then that state's law
governs, provided that the tortfeasor's actual or intended course of
conduct was such as to make foreseeable the occurrence of the injury
in that state.
This rule would not apply to products liability conflicts, and, like the
Louisiana rule, it should be accompanied with a carefully drafted escape
clause that would allow a court to deviate from the prescribed result in
appropriate cases."
If a rule like this were in place, then the eighty-six percent of cases that
applied the pro-plaintiff law of either the state of conduct or the state of
injury would have been decided in exactly the same way. Of course, one
could argue that these cases were wrongly decided, and thus a rule that
reproduces these results simply replicates a flawed system. Although, as
explained earlier, this Author does not subscribe to this view, this is a
matter on which reasonable minds can differ. Nevertheless, from a
274. See supra notes 218-19.
275. In loss distribution conflicts, the Louisiana codification requires the application of the pro-
plaintiff law of the state injury in Pattern 2 cases (subject to certain conditions and escapes), but,
unlike the cases discussed supra Part II.A, it does not require the application of the pro-plaintiff law of
the state of conduct in the converse cases of Pattern i. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 3544 (2oo8). In
punitive damages conflicts, the codification, unlike many of the cases, requires the concurrence of two
contacts in a state imposing punitive damages in order to allow punitive damages under that state's
law. Id. art. 3546.
276. For a favorable assessment, see Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana's Conflicts Codification: Some
Empirical Observations Regarding Decisional Predictability, 6o LA. L. REV. Io6i, io68 (2ooo), finding that
the Louisiana codification "has improved ... the predictability of decisions in conflicts cases."
277. See Symeonides, Exegesis, supra note 217, at 735-49 (describing the strong opposition of
certain lobbyists to punitive damages).
278. For the function, uses, utility, and style of escape clauses, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Exception
Clauses in American Conflicts Law, 42 AM. J. COMPn. L. SUP 8I3 (i994~). For a critique of escapes clauses
commonly employed in Europe, such as in the Rome II Regulation, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II
and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 192-204 (2oo8).
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pragmatic systemic perspective, there is much to be said in favor of a rule
that provides predictability, reduces litigation expenses, and lightens the
courts' choice-of-law burdens, without changing the substantive results of
the case law. If a rule like the one proposed above were in place, the cases
discussed in Part II would have been decided in the same way, but the
decisions would have come early and easily, sparing courts and litigants the
cost and uncertainty of litigating the choice-of-law question. Indeed, one
could argue that a rule like this would have facilitated early settlements in
most of these cases, without resort to litigation. If parties know the
applicable law beforehand, this will likely put them in a better position to
make an intelligent decision regarding whether or not to litigate. Even if
litigation cannot be avoided, such a rule would conserve judicial resources
by relieving courts of the burdens and risks of a laborious-and often
inconsistent-judicial determination and evaluation of state policies and
interests.
This rule, of course, could have also changed the result in the
remaining fourteen percent of cases from a pro-defendant to a pro-plaintiff
law, thus potentially raising the percentage of pro-plaintiff results from
eighty-six to one hundred percent. However, the use of the escape clause
could prevent this change in some cases or change the result in other cases,
thus keeping the overall balance more or less the same. Admittedly,
though, this would not provide consolation for those defendants who would
have fared better under the current case law. Consequently, the proposed
rule should be defended on its merits. To that end, all the arguments
offered earlier in defense of the pro-plaintiff bent of the current case law'
are reiterated here. In addition, the proposed rule can be defended pattern-
by-pattern along the lines suggested below.
In Pattern 2 cases (the true conflict pattern), the proposed rule will
lead to the application of the law of the state of injury rather than the pro-
defendant law of the state of conduct. As explained earlier, both states in
these cases have a legitimate claim to apply their law. On balance, however,
the application of the law of the state of injury is appropriate in these
situations, especially because it is conditioned on objective foreseeability. It
is worth noting that the lex loci delicti rule, which has reigned for more than
a century, did not include this condition, nor do most of the European rules
discussed above. Because of the foreseeability proviso, one can defend the
application of the law of the state of injury not only on the basis of that
state's interest or on the basis of the favor laesi principle, but on the basis of
basic principles of accountability. One who predictably causes harm in a
state whose law considers that harm tortious should be held accountable
under that law.2"o As Cavers noted, under these circumstances "it is equally
279. See supra notes 196-9 and accompanying text.
280. See Weinberg. supra note 15. at 1654 ("The argument is sometimes made that the defendant is
4o6 [Vol. 61:337
WHY PLAINTIFFS WIN AND SHOULD
fair to hold [the tortfeasor] to the standards of the state into which he sent
whatever harmful agent, animal, object, or message caused the injury." 2hI
The proposed rule can also be easily defended in conduct-regulation
conflicts falling within Pattern Ia-cases in which the tortfeasor violates the
conduct-regulation standards of the state of conduct but not those of the
state of injury. For reasons explained earlier, these cases are clearly false
conflicts in which only the state of conduct has an interest in applying its
law. This rule will resolve these conflicts-as have most of the cases-by
applying the law of the only interested state. This result is not unfair to the
defendant. One who violates the laws of the state of conduct should not be
allowed to avoid the consequences of that violation merely because the
injury occurred on the other side of the border.
The loss-distribution conflicts falling within Pattern ib are a bit more
difficult, but only if one accepts Currie's assumptions that a state is
interested only in protecting its domiciliaries and not out-of-staters similarly
situated. On the other hand, if one does not subscribe to these assumptions,
then there is little reason to question the application of the law of the state
of conduct in these cases. As the discussion in Part H indicates, the majority
of cases involving these conflicts have rejected these assumptions and have
applied the law of the state of conduct.
Finally, Professor Louise Weinberg, who has characterized this
Author's previous work as too conservative and not sufficiently
sympathetic to plaintiffs, offers bolder and more eloquent arguments:
Systematic choices of plaintiff-favoring law are better public policy
than systematic choices of defendant-favoring law. When defendants
engage in risky activities in reliance upon lax standards in their home
states, shared public policies (favoring safety and fair dealing) would
seem better served not by indulging such defendants in their race to
the regulatory bottom, but rather by permitting plaintiffs injured by
those activities to seek enforcement of higher legal standards. It is also
sound public policy, universally recognized in American tort law, that
innocent plaintiffs not bear the risk of their own injuries."'
unfairly surprised and cannot adequately structure its enterprise if it is to be stripped of its defenses under
an interested state's laws. Yet a defendant's insurer is the paradigmatic actuarial expert, and has every
opportunity to structure the insured's coverage accordingly. It has every opportunity to adjust the
defendant's premiums to take into account this and other risks. Given the near universality of liability
insurance among suable defendants, it is somewhat unreal to speak of 'unfair surprise' to tort defendants.
They have insured against liability precisely because they anticipate it under some state's laws.").
281. CAVERs, supra note 200, at 141.
282. Weinberg, supra note 15, at 1654. In criticizing this Author's defense of neutrality and
evenhandedness towards litigants, Professor Weinberg argues that in tort conflicts the two parties are not
and should not be presumed to be equal. Id. at 1668. She notes that, before a plaintiff gets a chance to argue
the choice-of-law question, the plaintiff's complaint must have survived a motion to dismiss on every other
ground, and that, for purposes of deciding that question, the allegations in the complaint are presumed to
be true. Id. This means that "the tort defendant is a presumptive tortfeasor [and] that the plaintiff
presumptively has suffered a legally cognizable injury at the defendant's hands," and should be given a
chance to prove her allegations under a law that allows such proof. Id. at 1668-69.
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3. Option Three
A third option is to follow the European rules discussed above and
leave the choice of law to the victim, but-as in the Oregon codification-
to also condition the choice of the pro-plaintiff law of the state of injury on
(a) objective foreseeability, and (b) an appropriately-phrased escape clause.
That rule would provide as follows:
When the tortfeasor and the victim are domiciled in different states,
the law of the state of conduct governs all claims against the tortfeasor,
unless:
(a) the injury occurred in another state and the victim requests the
application of the law of that state; and
(b) the tortfeasor's actual or intended course of conduct were such as
to make foreseeable the occurrence of the injury in that state.
The victim's request must be submitted to the court in writing on or
before [a specified early time in the proceedings] and must encompass
all claims and issues against the defendant.
The idea of allowing one party to choose the applicable law, especially
after the dispute arises, is new in the United States.283 It is politically
provocative and sounds unilaterally suspicious. Since the beginning of
conflicts-law history, the choice of the law governing multistate cases has
been made either: (i) by the lawgiver in advance through preformulated
choice-of-law rules, (2) by the judge in deciding the particular case, or (3)
through a combination of these two methods. In all cases, the choice was
made by impartial public actors. The will of private parties has entered the
picture relatively recently. Over the last two centuries, most legal systems
have begun resurrecting-and gradually employing-the ancient principle
of party autonomy, which allows parties to a multistate dispute to select the
law that will govern the dispute.'4 By now, this principle is "perhaps the
most widely accepted private international rule of our time." 8
However, this principle has traditionally been limited to the law of
contracts and has only contemplated a predispute choice agreed to by both
parties. If the parties to a contract agreed in advance that a particular law
would govern their future contractual dispute,"' then a court would honor
the agreement as long as the agreement was otherwise valid and the
283. Obviously, allowing both parties to agree on the applicable law after the dispute arises is far less
problematic. For example, in the United States, when neither party argues for the application of non-forum
law, most courts will decide the case under forum law, even if the forum's choice-of-law rules would
normally point to non-forum law. See SYMEONIDES ET AL., supra note 16, at xo7- i.
284. See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE, 8, 17, 37, 41, 54-61, 183-
85 ('993).
285. Russell J. Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts, 187 RECUEIL DES
Couns 239, 271 (5984). For a discussion of party autonomy and its limitations in contracts, see ScoLEs, HAY,
BORtCHERS, & SYMEONIDES, supra note 9, at 947-87, and SYMlEONIDEs, surpa note 38, at 197-223-
286. For the ability of contracting parties to choose the law that will govern future noncontractual
disputes arising from a contract, see SCOLEs, HAY. BORCHERS, & SYMEONIDEs, supra note 9, §§ 17.40 n.2-
30, 18.r n.I8; SYMEONIDES, supra note 38, at 212-14.
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contract did not exceed certain public-policy limts. In recent years, many
systems have extended this principle to certain status-like contracts, such as
those regulating the property relations of spouses and, lately, testate
successions law, where the testator is now allowed (within certain limits) to
designate the law that will govern his or her succession.t8 In the latter case,
the choice of law is made by a single party-the testator-who, besides
being in a different position than either party in adversarial litigation,
makes the choice before the dispute arises. In contrast, proposed option
three gives a postdispute choice to one party who is already an actual or
potential litigant. For this reason, one would be justified in assuming that
such a rule is too generous to that party and, thus, unfair to the other party.
However, closer examination reveals a more complex picture.
To begin with, the notion of a postdispute choice by one party may be
novel, but, in terms of the end result, it is not different than requiring the
court to choose a law that favors a certain party, as the above rules do. If
anything, a rule that directly allows the party to choose which law governs
has certain practical advantages, which will be explained later.
Second, result-oriented choice-of-law rules -albeit more subtle ones -
have been around for centuries."' Typically, these rules contain a list of
alternative references to the laws of several states connected with the case
("alternative-reference" rules) and authorize the court to select a law that
produces the preferred substantive result, such as favoring the status of
marriage, legitimacy, filiation, or adoption.290 By favoring a particular status,
these rules also favor, directly or indirectly, the party or parties whose
interests depend on the particular status.
Third, in recent years, many systems have extended the notion of
expressly favoring certain litigants to parties other than tort victims, such as
maintenance obligees, consumers, employees, or other parties whom the
legal order considers weak or whose interests are considered worthy of
protection. These systems authorize the choice of the most favorable law
from among the laws of several states having contacts with the case. For
example, the German codification allows a choice from among the laws of
(i) the obligee's habitual residence, (2) the common nationality of the
obligor and the obligee, or (3) the law of the forum.29' Similar rules in the
1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance
Obligations,292 the 1989 Inter-American Convention on Support
287. See SCOLEs, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 9, at 947-87; SYMEONIDES, supra note
38, at 197-222.
288. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Result-Selectivism in Private International Law, 46 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2010) (manuscript at 13, 20), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=113363o;
SYMEONIDES, supra note 264, at 38-40,56-7.
289. See SYMIEONIDEs, supra note 264, at 38-40, 48-56.
290. See Symeonides, supra note 288.
291. See EGBGB3, supra note 237, art. '8.
292. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, Oct. 2, 1973, Oct. I, 1977,
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Obligations,293 and several national or subnational codifications,294 allow
similar and sometimes broader choices. The Belgian PIL Code extends the
concept of postdispute choice by one party to the owner of stolen cultural
property or other movable property.' Finally, many systems protect
consumers and employees from the adverse consequences of their own
potentially coerced or uninformed assents to choice-of-law clauses. These
systems provide that a choice-of-law clause may not deprive the consumer
or employee of the protection afforded by the mandatory rules of the
country whose law would govern the consumer or employment contract in
the absence of such a clause.296 Thus, a choice-of-law clause can expand, but
cannot contract, the protection available to consumers or employees.
Again, the materially desirable result of protecting members of a protected
class is given preference over considerations of "conflicts justice."2"
This list of result-oriented rules is a reminder, if one were needed, that
conflicts law often adopts rules that are directly designed to reach a specific
substantive result that the system considers preferable. The common
denominator among the above rules is that they are all designed to level the
conflicts field between presumptively strong parties and presumptively
weak parties, such as tort victims or maintenance obligees. Initially, the
leveling tool was entrusted only to the courts. In recent years, it has been
given directly to the presumptively weak parties themselves.
arts. 4-6, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=86 (choice between
the lex fori and the law of the obligee's habitual residence, or the common national law of the obligor and
the obligee); see also Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards Children,
Oct. 24, 1956, arts. 1-3, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid-37
(choice between the lex fori and the law of the child's habitual residence).
293. INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS, July 15, 1989. 29 INT'L MATERIALS LEGIs.
& PERSP. 73, art. 6 (1990) (choice from among the laws of the habitual residence or domicile of either
obligor or obligee).
294. See Belgian PIL Code, supra note 248, art. 74 (choice from three different laws); C. civ. art. 311-18
(Fr.) (giving the choice directly to the child); Quebec Civ. Code, supra note 235, art. 3094 (choice between
the law of the domicile of the obligee or the obligor); Tunisian PIL Code, supra note 246. art. 51 (allowing
the court to choose from among four potentially different laws the one most favorable to the obligee; the
four laws are those of the obligee's nationality or domicile or the obligor's nationality or domicile); see also
Hungarian PIL Act, supra note 241, art. 46 (providing that, with regard to the status, family relationships,
and maintenance rights of children living in Hungary, Hungarian law applies whenever it is more favorable
to the child than the otherwise applicable law).
295. See Belgian PIL Code, supra note 248, arts. 90, 92 (giving owner a conditional choice between the
state of origin and the state in which the property is found at the time of the claim). For a comparable
provision applicable to movable things claimed by usucaption or acquisitive prescription, see Romanian
PIL Act, supra note 252, art. 146.
296. See Regulation No 593/2008, On the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I),
2oo8 O.J. (L 177) 6, arts. 6, 8 (EC). Similar provisions are found in the laws of many countries, including
Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Quebec, Romania. Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. See
Symeonides, supra note 288 (manuscript at 13).
297. For the meaning of "conflicts justice" as opposed to "material justice," see Symeonides, supra note
46.
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Is there a difference between giving this tool to the tort victim rather
than to the court? Substantively, the answer is no. From the defendant's
perspective, it makes no difference because the outcome would be the
same. The same is true from the plaintiff's perspective. The only difference,
then, is from the court's perspective. When the choice is given to the court,
the court has to determine and explain why one state's law is more
favorable than the other state's law. Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not always
easy because the law of a state may favor one party in some respects and
another party in other respects, and an erroneous determination would be
a ground for appeal like any other error of law. On the other hand, if the
choice is given to the plaintiff, this would obviate the need for a judicial
answer to the question of whether a given law indeed favors the victim.
This is particularly helpful, not only in cases in which that answer is unclear,
but also in cases in which one state's law favors the plaintiff on some issues
and the defendant on other issues. The rule avoids the possibility of an
inappropriate ddpeQage or "picking and choosing." The plaintiff will have to
carefully weigh all the pros and cons of exercising or not exercising the right
to choose, and if the plaintiff exercises that right, the choice must be for "all
claims and issues against the defendant." If the choice proves ill-advised, it
will not be appealable, and the plaintiff will only have him- or herself to
blame.
In conclusion, therefore, one can say that, if given a chance, the idea of
giving the choice to one party will prove to be a smart, efficient, and cost-
saving tool that will help conserve judicial resources. One hopes that its
political baggage and novelty will not prevent it from being considered on
its merits. In any event, this Author hopes that readers will find value in this
Article, even if they disagree with this particular proposal.
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